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Mapping Digital Media
Th e values that underpin good journalism, the need of citizens for reliable and abundant information, and 
the importance of such information for a healthy society and a robust democracy: these are perennial, and 
provide compass-bearings for anyone trying to make sense of current changes across the media landscape. 
Th e standards in the profession are in the process of being set. Most of the eff ects on journalism imposed 
by new technology are shaped in the most developed societies, but these changes are equally infl uencing the 
media in less developed societies.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project, which examines the changes in-depth, aims to build bridges between 
researchers and policymakers, activists, academics and standard-setters across the world. It also builds policy 
capacity in countries where this is less developed, encouraging stakeholders to participate in and infl uence 
change. At the same time, this research creates a knowledge base, laying foundations for advocacy work, 
building capacity and enhancing debate. 
Th e Media Program of the Open Society Foundations has seen how changes and continuity aff ect the media in 
diff erent places, redefi ning the way they can operate sustainably while staying true to values of pluralism and 
diversity, transparency and accountability, editorial independence, freedom of expression and information, 
public service, and high professional standards.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project assesses, in the light of these values, the global opportunities and risks 
that are created for media by the following developments:
 the switch-over from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting;
 growth of new media platforms as sources of news;
 convergence of traditional broadcasting with telecommunications.
Covering 60 countries, the project examines how these changes aff ect the core democratic service that any 
media system should provide—news about political, economic and social aff airs. 
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Th e Mapping Digital Media reports are produced by local researchers and partner organizations in each 
country. Cumulatively, these reports will provide a much-needed resource on the democratic role of digital 
media.
In addition to the country reports, the Open Society Media Program has commissioned research papers on a 
range of topics related to digital media. Th ese papers are published as the MDM Reference Series.
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Mapping Digital Media: Estonia
Executive Summary
Estonia blazed a trail, in terms of digitization, by completing digital switch-over of television in 2010, and 
adopting the relatively advanced MPEG-4 compression standard. Th is occurred fi ve years ahead of the 
originally envisaged target of 2015. 
However, only a minority of households was actually aff ected by the switch-over. Th e success of the simulcast 
transition period, the dominance of cable, and the rapidly expanding internet protocol television (IPTV) 
platform meant that the switch-off  of analog signals went largely unnoticed. IPTV was already the main 
television platform for just under 20 percent of households, and its growth has threatened sustainable 
competition in free-to-air television. Of the four new digital channels licensed in 2008, only one remains 
(operated by the public broadcaster). Two others have been restructured as pay-TV off erings, and the fourth 
has closed altogether. 
In other areas, Estonians have demonstrated a keen appetite for digital media uptake. More than three-quarters 
of the population accesses the internet regularly, and more than half of those are active on social networking 
platforms. Recent surveys suggest that nearly a quarter of internet users now connect via smartphones. As for 
traditional media, newspaper circulations have experienced a steady rather than dramatic decline over recent 
years, while television and radio audiences remain relatively stable. 
Despite rapid growth in the readership of online news sites—predominantly those run by established media—
broadcasting remains the dominant source for news and information. One key change in consumption over 
recent years has been the rapid growth of new thematic channels on cable and other pay-TV platforms, 
particularly among younger viewers. But this has not corresponded to an increase in news output, in terms 
of either quality or quantity. Th e most watched news programs have remained relatively unchanged, and 
there has been little progress toward more interactive services. A similar story can be told of online news, 
where most sites still do not produce original content or multimedia formats. Where they do, this tends to 
be limited in terms of context, analysis, and production values. 
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Th us, the potential for digital media to generate diversity in the overall news off er has not been fully realized, 
despite Estonia’s advanced stage of digital media development. Th e relatively small and fragmented television 
market has made for intense ratings competition between news providers, raising fears that quality and 
diversity may in fact come under pressure in the new digital landscape.
Th e launch of the public broadcaster’s second television channel in 2008 has, however, been a broad success—
despite the modest scale of funds invested in it—adding a degree of niche and minority programming to 
the free-to-air television off er—although the decision to move the Russian-language newscast from the fi rst 
to the second channel resulted in a signifi cant drop in audience. Th e latest development plan of the public 
broadcaster foresees the expansion and improvement of its Russian-language services, and a widening of its 
role in the digital environment to include educational and informational services. Whether such ideals will 
be achieved remains uncertain, particularly in light of signifi cant recent funding cuts.
In the meantime, Estonians are increasingly engaged in online news via social media platforms. More than 
a third of users are accustomed to posting links to news stories, or commenting on news via their social 
networking profi les. Th ere is also a thriving culture of commenting on the news websites of established 
media. So much so that in a landmark case in 2009, the Supreme Court ruled that media organizations have 
editorial responsibility for these comment sections, adding a burden to online newsrooms that are already 
badly under-resourced.
Alongside the commenting culture, citizen journalism is developing independent of established media, as 
demonstrated by a dedicated self-publishing platform run by the Estonian Civic Journalism Order. Beyond 
this, however, recent research suggests that Estonians have not fully exploited the opportunities for citizenship 
and activism off ered by digital tools, despite the availability of relatively advanced e-government services and 
a strong civil society presence online. One recent study found that only 11 percent of social media users have 
made a post, commented on, or asked questions about a theme related to politics or politicians. 
More encouragingly perhaps, nearly a quarter of respondents had invited their “friends” to participate in civic 
engagements or initiatives, and Estonians have been increasingly active in single-issue campaigns over recent 
years, particularly via Facebook.
One of the most talked about has been a campaign called “My Estonia—Let’s do it!”, which mobilized more 
than 50,000 volunteers in 2008 to collect 10,000 tonnes of illegally dumped garbage across the country. 
Th e campaign made use of Google imaging software to identify target areas and social media platforms to 
generate awareness, demonstrating the full potential of digital tools in civil society activism. Since then, it has 
developed into a global civil society movement involving 96 countries and 7 million volunteers around the 
world in the World Cleanup Action of 2012.
Th e extent to which such successful digital mobilizations rely on support from traditional media remains 
unclear. What is certain is that journalists at traditional newspapers continue to face budget cuts, redundancies, 
reductions in output, and the cancellation or postponement of long-form journalistic projects. In short, cost-
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cutting has become the default feature of traditional newspaper business models with potentially harmful 
consequences for news quality and diversity. In particular, the demands on print journalists to carry out 
multiple production, publishing, and editing tasks at ever greater speeds, combined with a growing intake of 
younger and relatively inexperienced journalists, has fashioned a newsroom culture that is de-professionalized, 
more top-down, and less creative. Of most concern from the perspective of public interest news, periodic 
survey data suggest that journalists increasingly identify with the goals of their employers over the social 
role of their profession. Th is is refl ected partly in a dramatic decline in trade union membership among 
journalists: from 60 percent in 1988 to just 17 percent in 2009. 
Th e problem is particularly acute in online newsrooms where the “click value” of stories—defi ned by the 
number of visitors they attract—often leads to fl awed editorial decisions and generates misleading or distorted 
headlines. Th e abundance of space and sources combined with increasingly scarce time has led to over-
reliance on PR material, promotional writing, political leaks, or second-hand stories from other news outlets. 
Few journalists have the capacity or autonomy to engage in long-form, investigative, or in-depth journalism.
Th is has resulted in missed opportunities, particularly given the proactive disclosure of data that has taken 
place in tandem with the growth of digital media. Public electronic databases enforced by law (such as 
the commercial register) and documents made available by state municipal and public institutions have 
certainly increased the potential for investigative journalism. Th e development of open and data journalism 
also off ers users increasingly interactive and dynamic ways to access news. However, this has not off set the 
impact of resource cuts on professional investigative journalists, and while blogs off er a cost-eff ective means 
of dissemination, their output is characterized as being opinion-based, irregular, and ephemeral. Several 
prominent blogs have faded away almost as soon as they gained notoriety, and there is evidence to suggest 
that the blogosphere in Estonia has passed its peak. 
As for conventional media, there have been no enduring new entrants in the news market over recent years, 
despite minimal cross-ownership regulation. Attempts by outside interests to capitalize on the convergence 
and proliferation of Estonia’s media market have to date ended in spectacular failure. In 2008, Kalev Meedia 
purchased several magazines, a cable channel, and a radio station, and launched an online news site and 
digital free-to-air television channel. Within a year, all its media operations had closed, the company itself 
was bankrupted, and some 200 employees lost their jobs.
Market fragmentation in television has benefi tted incumbents who can exploit their established brands and 
leverage content across increasing numbers of outlets and platforms. Growth has taken place on cable and 
other pay-TV platforms, rather than on terrestrial platforms. One major sticking point concerns the ability 
of commercial terrestrial broadcasters to be compensated by cable companies for carrying their content. 
In December 2012, the law was amended to clarify the right of terrestrial broadcasters to claim such 
compensation; agreement with the cable companies followed shortly after.
Although television advertising revenues were hit hard by the global economic downturn—falling by 31 
percent in 2009—recovery is now well under way. Th e same cannot be said for public broadcasting, whose 
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annual state budget allocation remains some way off  its high point in 2008. But it is newspapers that have 
been hit hardest by cyclical pressures, losing over 40 percent of advertising revenue in 2009. More ominously, 
the recession appears to have catalyzed both advertiser and reader migration to online platforms, with little 
sign of publishers being able to monetize online news content.
Th ere is still some life left in newspapers due to their well-established position within the Estonian media 
landscape; for only in 2010 did television advertising revenues eclipse those of newspapers for the fi rst time. 
Advertising losses to date have also been largely off set by cutbacks and savings in distribution costs enabled 
by digital technologies. But there is a strong sense that both newspapers and broadcasters have gone as far 
as they can in reducing costs, adding to the uncertainties stemming from the small scale of the market, the 
fragmentation of audiences, and the unpredictability of consumption patterns in the ever-changing digital 
environment.
In the face of such uncertainty, policymakers have stood by their commitment to technological and service 
neutrality—two principles enshrined in the Radio Frequency Allocation Plan adopted in 2005. At the same 
time, the law provides for regulatory intervention to ensure effi  cient use of spectrum, and the authorities have 
demonstrated their willingness to implement this. In one recent case, a digital license was revoked after the 
operator failed to launch a multiplex within the specifi ed time period. Regulatory intervention has also been 
forthcoming in respect of Levira, which enjoys a natural monopoly as transmission network operator but has 
been subject to price controls and specifi c orders aimed at neutralizing its gatekeeping power. 
Th ough licensing procedures are generally considered transparent and free from political bias, there has 
been some controversy as regards the absence of a formal independent media regulator—Estonia being the 
only EU member state without such a body. Only in early 2013 were proposals to establish an independent 
regulator revived, having languished for more than 10 years. At this time of writing, the changes are under 
parliamentary procedure and the fi nal outcome cannot be assessed or even fully described. 
As for publishers, though there are some statutory provisions that allow for government agencies and the 
courts to intervene in press regulation, both have tended to defer to self-regulatory mechanisms. But rather 
than providing an eff ective means of accountability, sanction, and redress, self-regulation has served primarily 
as a shield to protect the press against external criticism.
On a positive note, the press and news organizations remain in general relatively free of political infl uence; 
and although there is signifi cant cross-media ownership and little opportunity for new entrants, digitization 
does not appear to have exacerbated this situation and there remains a degree of competition and pluralism 
within all sectors. Th e quantity of the overall news off er has undoubtedly increased over recent years, but not 
necessarily the spectrum of choice. And while the explosion of social media platforms has enabled various 
and growing numbers of groups to share their views and tell their stories, resource cuts have compromised the 
provision of good-quality public interest news. It remains to be seen whether the emergence of new business 
models will reverse or exacerbate this decline. 
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In conclusion, the reporters call for the development of media policy that will incentivize television service 
providers to introduce the additional digital television services that were promoted during switch-over. Th ey 
also call for long-term predictable funding mechanisms to ensure that public service media, Estonian Public 
Broadcasting (Eesti Rahvusringhääling, ERR) above all, provide quality output.
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Context
With a population of just 1.3 million, Estonia is one of the least populous members of the European Union 
(EU). It is a multi-ethnic country, although the signifi cant Russian-speaking minority (30 percent) is 
concentrated within just two of the country’s 15 regional counties. 
As a relatively young parliamentary democracy, Estonia has developed a strong tradition and international 
reputation for both political and press freedom. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 
1991, it has also developed a stable and robust market economy characterized by high levels of growth and 
employment. Although signifi cantly aff ected by the global recession between 2008 and 2010, indicators in 
2012 suggest the recovery is well under way, driven by strong export growth. Estonia maintains a low level 
of public debt and as of 2012 was, signifi cantly, the only EU country to have achieved a budget surplus. 
However, there remain deep regional and demographic inequalities, with the country’s wealth overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the capital, Tallinn.
Estonia is also considered among the most advanced countries in the world in terms of digital media 
development and uptake, completing digital switch-over of television in 2010, far ahead of schedule. But 
the relatively small and fragmented media market, among other factors, has impeded progress toward a more 
plural and diverse media ecology. 
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Social Indicators
Population (number of inhabitants): 1.3 million (2011 census)
Number of households: 585,100 (2011 census)
Figure 1. 
Rural–urban breakdown (% of total population), 2011
Source: Data from Statistics Estonia, 2011 census, preliminary fi ndings, at http://www.stat.ee (accessed 10 January 2013)
Figure 2.
Ethnic composition (% of total population), 2011
Source: Data from Statistics Estonia, 2011 census, preliminary fi ndings, at http://www.stat.ee (accessed 10 January 2013)  
Ukrainians, 1.7 Other, 4.8
Estonians, 68.7Russians, 24.8
Urban, 67.9 Rural, 32.1
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Figure 3.
Linguistic composition (% of total population), 2011
Source: Data from Statistics Estonia, 2011 census, preliminary fi ndings, at http://www.stat.ee (accessed 10 January 2013)
Figure 4.
Religious composition (% of population over 15 years old), 2000
Source: Data from Statistics Estonia, 2000 census 
Estonian, 68.5
Other, 1.2
Russian, 29.6
Ukrainian, 0.6 Unknown, 0.1
Baptist, 0.5
Unknown, 0.1
Catholic, 0.5
Unrevealed or unknown, 30.6
Other, 1.7
Muslim, 0.1
Lutheran, 13.6
Orthodox, 12.8
Atheist or no religion, 40.2
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Economic Indicators
Table 1.
Economic indicators
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012o
GDP (current prices, 
US$ billion)
13.9 16.8 21.6 23.7 19.3 19.2 19.8 20.7
GDP (current prices, US$), 
per head
10,317 12,499 16,160 17,651 14,402 14,416 14,948 15,607
Gross National Income (GNI), 
(current US$), per head
15,920 18,160 20,160 20,970 19,230 19,380 20,830 n/a
Unemployment 
(% of total labor force)
7.9 5.9 4.6 5.5 13.7 15.51 16.3 14.4
Infl ation (average annual rate, 
% against previous year)
4.0 4.4 6.6 10.3 –0.0 3.02 1.9 2.0
Notes: o: outlook; n/a: not available
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF) for GDP, unemployment, and infl ation data, unless otherwise stated; World Bank 
for GNI
1. Data from Statistics Estonia, 2010, Q3, at http://www.stat.ee (accessed 15 February 2011).
2. Data from Statistics Estonia, 2010, at http://www.stat.ee (accessed 15 February 2011).
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1. Media Consumption: 
 The Digital Factor
1.1 Digital Take-up
1.1.1 Digital Equipment
Digital reception is expanding rapidly in Estonia, enabled by broadband internet access. Th e latter has been 
technologically bound up with cable television, which is also switching to digital transmission. Th e terrestrial 
television switched over to digital transmission mode on 1 July 2010, freeing spectrum for a “digital dividend,” 
and requiring households to obtain either set-top boxes or television sets with built-in MPEG-4 receiving 
ability. However, according to the market research company TNS Emor, up to 1.5 percent of households 
were unprepared for switch-over and faced a sudden loss of television signal.3 Th ose receiving signal via cable 
(including IPTV) or satellite (Viasat), on the other hand, were unaff ected by switch-over. Upgrading to 
digital cable is expected to take place gradually over the coming years.
Th e number of television sets within households has been growing steadily. In about a quarter of households 
there are now two television sets in working order, 9 percent have three working television sets, and some 
2–3 percent operate four or more television sets within the household. Many of these television sets became 
dysfunctional as a result of switch-over as they were not equipped with digiboxes. Th e proportion of households 
without a television set in working order amounted to 2–2.5 percent prior to switch-over, increasing to 
4.2 percent immediately afterwards. About 1.4 percent of households had a functional television set but 
could not receive any program on it. As described in the Final Report by the Government Commission on 
Transition to Digital Terrestrial Television, this contingent was heterogeneous: it comprised both young 
and elderly, predominantly in southern and rural Estonia. It included those people leaving the technical 
upgrading to the last minute and those not valuing television enough to spend money on new electronic 
devices or who could not aff ord it.4
3. Data by TNS Emor, retrieved from “Maapealse analoogtelevisiooni levitamise lõpetamine ja täielikule digitaalsele levile üleminek Eestis aastatel 
2007–2010” (End of Terrestrial Analog Television Broadcasting and Overall Transition to Digital Broadcasting in Estonia 2007–2010), Final 
Report of the Government Commission on Transition to Digital Terrestrial Television, 9 November 2010, at http://www.emor.ee (accessed 12 
December 2012) (hereafter, TNS Emor, 2010).
4. TNS Emor, 2010.
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Table 2.
Households owning equipment, 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 20108 2009 20105 2011
No. of 
HH6 
(’000)
% of 
THH7
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
TV set 492 93.0 517 98.0 509 98.9 507 98.9 507 98.9 497 96.9 497 96.9
Radio set8 511 96.6 505 95.7 489 95.1 477 93.0 471 92.0 468 91.3 n/a n/a
PC 227 43.0 274 52.0 293 57.0 305 59.6 333 65.1 3899 69.2 409 71.4
Note: n/a: not available
Sources: Calculations by OSF editors based on data from International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Statistics Estonia, and 
TNS Emor 
1.1.2 Platforms
Ultimately, digital switch-off  aff ected only 13.5 percent of households, with a further 36 percent having 
already made the switch during the simulcast period beginning in 2005. 
Th e fi rst schedule for digitization, in the “Concept for Digital Television” (2004), envisaged that switch-
over would happen by 2015. Th is date was rescheduled to 2010 a couple of years later.10 Th is policy foresaw 
that terrestrial and mobile digital television would be the most promising digital platforms in Estonia. Th e 
“Concept” argued that digital satellite television probably had no future as the country’s small size does not 
qualify for a major satellite market. It was therefore surprising that the Viasat digital satellite service was 
introduced subsequently. By 2008, IPTV was making inroads into the digital broadcasting market. 2008 
also saw an increase in satellite television reception, while cable usage remained constant. Th e use of satellite 
reception subsequently decreased. Th is was presumably due to the extension of IPTV—by then reaching 
remote private households—and the inadmissibility of attaching receiver disks to apartment building facades. 
Later, terrestrial pay-TV was also launched. 
According to the Final Report of the Government Commission on Transition to Digital Terrestrial Television 
(DTT), cable maintained its share among television reception platforms during the initial transition to DTT, 
5. After the switch to digital, according to data from TNS Emor, 4.2 percent of households did not possess a TV set capable of receiving a digital 
signal. See U. Jaagant, “Aruanne: digilevile üleminek kahekordistas telekatõrjujate arvu” (Report: Digital Switch-over Doubled the Number 
of TV-defi ers), Eesti Päevaleht, 1 December 2010, at http://www.epl.ee/news/eesti/aruanne-digilevile-uleminek-kahekordistas-telekatorjujate-
arvu.d?id=51287662 (accessed 10 January 2013).
6. Total number of households owning the equipment.
7. Total number of households in the country.
8. At least one radio set in the household. Data by TNS Emor (Q1 sample), at http://www.emor.ee.
9. Data from Statistics Estonia, at http://www.stat.ee.
10. See U. Loit, “Estonia,” in Television across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, OSI, Budapest, pp. 612–613 (hereafter, Loit, Television 
across Europe).
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growing slightly after 2008. According to the report, the share of digital cable distribution has maintained 
its rate at 15 percent.
Along with online, the i-Pad and tablet platform is establishing itself for newspapers, even though currently it 
tends to be used for entertainment, developed mainly by the Ekspress Group (Eesti Ekspress, Eesti Päevaleht). 
Th us far, surveys show that only 23 percent of internet users use smartphones for accessing the internet, and 
only 10 percent use tablet computers for that purpose.11 However, usage is growing and up to 44 percent of 
young people (15–29 years old) access Facebook via smartphones.
Table 3. 
Platform for the main TV reception and digital take-up, 2005–201012
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
Terrestrial reception 273 48.6 261 45.8 190 33.5 155 26.9 170 29.8 145 25.8
– of which digital n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 0.5 16 2.7 60 10.5 115 20.4
Cable reception 246 43.8 247 43.4 307 54.3 318 55.5 296 51.8 293 52.1
– of which digital n/a n/a n/a n/a 14 2.4 20 3.4 22 3.9 14 2.6
Satellite reception 23 4.1 35 6.1 32 5.6 46 8.0 48 8.4 32 5.7
IPTV n/a n/a n/a n/a 31 5.6 56 9.8 73 12.8 108 19.2
Total digital n/a n/a 27 4.8 86 15.2 135 23.6 190 33.3 254 45.1
Notes: HH: total number of households owning the equipment; TVHH: total number of TV households in the country; 
n/a: not available
Source: Mediamétrie/Eurodata TV Worldwide
Even though Estonia ranked fi fth in the world for mobile broadband quality in 2010,13 the same study 
indicated that broadband quality needed to be improved across the country—particularly fi xed broadband 
networks in rural regions. Th e Estonian Broadband Development Foundation (Eesti Lairiba Arenduse 
Sihtasutus, ELASA), a body founded at the initiative of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Communications 
and by the members of the Estonian Association of Information Technology and Telecommunications 
(Eesti Infotehnoloogia ja Telekommunikatsiooni Liit, ITL), has set the goal of providing all residential houses, 
businesses, and authorities with connections to a next-generation broadband network, and achieving a data 
transmission speed of up to 100 Mbit/s by the year 2015.14 Th is will entail the installation of more than 
6,000 km of fi ber-optic cable and the construction of more than 1,400 connection points to ensure that 98 
11. Survey by GfK Custom Research Baltic and the PRB Agency, conducted in February 2012, at http://www.gfk.com/gfkbaltic/public_relations/
press_releases/index.ee.html (in Estonian, accessed 30 January 2013).
12. Th e fi gures refer to the main TV set in multi-TV households.
13. Situation in September 2010—Broadband Quality Score III, “A Global Study of Broadband Quality,” October 2010, Said Business School, 
University of Oxford. Th is study indicates, however, that broadband quality needs to be improved across the country, particularly fi xed networks 
in rural regions. 
14. Th is project is called EstWin: see http://www.elasa.ee/index.php?page=3 (accessed 20 February 2013).
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percent of residences, businesses, and authorities are located closer than 1.5 km to the basic network. Th is 
vision for the future has been approved by the government.
Th e overall internet usage rate in Estonia is slightly higher (78.4 percent) than the EU27 average (73 percent), 
as at the beginning of 2012, according to a government report.15 Estonia still lags behind the leader countries 
(in Sweden and Netherlands the rate is almost 90 percent): 75 percent of households (and over 90 percent 
of households with children) have internet connection, technically mainly broadband, of which half still 
does not enable high-speed connection (40+ Mbit/s). High-speed internet connection is, according to the 
government overview referring to a Praxis study,16 available to only 45 percent of households, mainly in 
apartment blocks in larger urban areas. Th ere is a digital divide between urban and rural regions (a diff erence 
of over 6 percentage points) with some regions (Pärnu, Jõgeva, Valga, and Viljandi Counties) lagging even 
further behind (7 percentage points below the rural average). Th e study points out that in 70 municipalities 
out of 226 there are no facilities equipped to provide broadband, which leaves 92,000 inhabitants without 
any high-speed internet access.
As to demographics, men and women use the internet almost in equal numbers—male use had caught up 
with female use by 2012. Th e government overview points out that unemployed persons constitute the most 
vulnerable group in terms of the digital divide along with persons of low educational level, who need to be 
supported, according to the evaluation.
Elderly people have also been spotlighted as a group with comparatively low internet usage: 56 percent of 
people aged 55–64 use the internet (an increase from 2011 of 6 percentage points), while only 27 percent 
of people aged 65–74 use the internet. Th e internet usage rate among the age group up to 44 years exceeded 
93 percent in 2012.
Table 4. 
Internet penetration rate (total internet subscriptions as % of the total population) and 
mobile penetration rate (total active SIM cards as % of total population), 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Internet 14.6 19.2 21.2 24.2 25.6 25.2 n/a
 – of which broadband 13.3 18.4 18.8 21.0 22.5 25.1 27.1
Mobile telephony 107.4 123.4 125.2 121.0 117.1 123.2 139.0
 – of which 3G17 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 27.0 n/a
Note: n/a: not available
Sources: OSF calculations based on ITU data
15. See Government of Estonia, “Ülevaade arvuti- ja internetikasutusest Eestis 2012” (Overview of Computer and Internet Use in Estonia in 2012), 
at http://valitsus.ee/et/valitsus/tegevusprogramm/e-riigist-i-riigiks/infoyhiskonna-arengu-hetkeseis/arvuti-ja-internetikasutus-eestis-2012 (ac-
cessed 20 February 2013).
16. O. Harjo, “Kiire internet vajab inimeste ja riigi panust” (High-speed Internet Needs Input from People and State), Postimees Online, 29 August 
2012, at http://arvamus.postimees.ee/954906/olav-harjo-kiire-internet-vajab-inimeste-ja-riigi-panust (accessed 20 February 2013).
17. “Th e Estonia Telecommunications Report 2011” estimates that 3G subscribers accounted for over 27 percent of the total mobile customer 
base at the end of 2010. See http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/1535395/estonia_telecommunications_report_2011.pdf (accessed 
15 February 2011).
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1 .2 Media Preferences 
 1.2.1 Main Shifts in Media Consumption
News consumption by platform diff ers along linguistic lines. A survey in 2002–200318 showed that the 
proportions of Estonians’ news consumption by media type were divided almost equally between national 
daily newspapers and national television (around 55 percent and 60 percent, respectively), while radio was 
considered an important source of news for a third of Estonians. An almost equal proportion of Estonia’s 
Russian-speaking community—a third of it—considered that television programming from Russia was an 
important news source. Th e internet, according to this survey, served as an important news source for 21 
percent of all respondents regardless of their fi rst language.
More recent audience research by TNS Emor shows rapid growth in the use of websites for acquiring news 
over the past fi ve years (in the case of Delfi .ee it has almost doubled), while newspaper circulation has 
experienced a slight decline. Concurrently, print media’s share in the breakdown of advertising expenditure is 
declining, especially compared with television, and the internet advertising share is growing.
Th e television news audience shares, as well as radio listenership (shares), have remained relatively stable over 
recent years. Overall, television viewing has increased slightly over the last fi ve years, exceeding four hours per 
day on average. Russian speakers watch television daily about an hour more than Estonian speakers.19 Viewing 
of niche television channels on cable networks both nationally and locally has increased exponentially over 
the last fi ve years. Whereas in 2005 such viewing was almost non-existent, by 2010 it had grown to over 10 
minutes per day.20
Th e newly licensed digital channels have left the free-to-air market and switched to the pay-TV (conditional 
access networks) sector to save on distribution costs (Kanal 11, TV 6), or gone bankrupt (Kalev Meedia). 
Th us, the sole addition to the free-to-air market has been ETV2, the second channel of the public service 
broadcaster.
Also, on several occasions, the large commercial television broadcasters have considered removing Kanal 2 and 
TV 3 from free-to-air distribution—so they can earn revenue from being distributed only over conditional 
access networks—as the free-to-air networks were not willing to pay the television broadcasters (who actually 
invest money in content production), justifying this practice with reference to the “must carry” clause in the 
18. MeeMa, “Mina. Maailm. Meedia” (Me. Th e World. Th e Media), survey by the University of Tartu in cooperation with Faktum research. Pub-
lished as V. Kalmus et al. (eds), Eesti elavik 21. sajandi algul (Estonian Habitation at the Beginning of the 21st Century), Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 
Tartu, 2004 (hereafter, “MeeMa Survey”).
19. In January 2011, 5 hrs 1 min for Russian-speakers and 4 hrs 14 mins for Estonians. Television viewing data by TNS Emor.
20. Data by TNS Emor, sourced from “Raha vs. vaadatavus: Eesti telemaastik 2010” (Money vs. Viewership: Estonian TV Landscape 2010), in Eesti 
Akadeemilise Ajakirjanduse Seltsi aastaraamat 2009/2010 (Yearbook of the Academic Society of Estonian Journalism 2009/2010), Tartu Ülikooli 
Kirjastus, Tartu, 2011, p. 110.
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Electronic Communication Act.21 In 2012, these threats became serious; at the end of the year, Kanal 2 and 
TV 3 were no longer shown on the STV and Starman networks, respectively, due to outstanding royalty 
payments owed to the content-providing broadcasters. (See section 6.3.)
1.2.2 Availability of a Diverse Range of News Platforms
Th e Broadcasting Act and the new Media Services Act obliges every television and radio media service provider 
(formerly the broadcasters) to reserve at least 5 percent of the daily transmission time of their program service 
on at least six days a week for transmitting self-produced news programs, except for the program service 
transmitted on national holidays.22
However, presumably due to the relatively small scale of the Estonian media market and its limited resources, 
television news output has not increased in line with the growth of television channels under the digital shift. 
Th e contest for digital national broadcasting licenses brought three new channels into the market. Only one 
of them (Kalev Sport) started to have regular newscasts and is now bankrupt. Kanal 11, operated by Kanal 
2, reruns the latter’s daily late-night infotainment show, “Reporter.” TV 6 fulfi lls the legal requirements by 
having text-TV news slides during the night and providing the static web-camera footage from the studio of 
the affi  liated radio station Star FM. Other small channels, distributed by local or nationwide cable networks, 
similarly fulfi ll the obligatory news volume mainly by running news text slides at “dead time” slots (with 
relatively low audiences).
Th us, the main newscasts on television have remained the same despite the digital switch-over and new 
interactive services have not blossomed. However, the news archives of the major television channels have 
emerged online, allowing audiences to watch archived clips on demand. Th e few thematic and niche television 
channels do not produce original news content.
Digital switch-over has marginally expanded access to multichannel television, but only one terrestrial 
provider (Levira) has launched a terrestrial pay-TV service (ZoomTV) in co-operation with Starman. Th e 
overall share of terrestrial broadcasting is still relatively insignifi cant, and consequently digitization has not 
revolutionized television viewing for most Estonians.
As for online-only news services, websites such as Delfi .ee now produce original news content on various 
platforms including video (Delfi .TV). But the output remains limited in quantity and quality. Much of 
it consists of user-generated content (UGC) with little in the way of context and analysis or professional 
production values. Th ey do, however, off er exclusive news content (primarily interviews with sources). 
Th e website of Äripäev business daily provides video content with production values that sometimes rival 
21. Article 90 stipulates, at section 1, that cable distribution service providers “must guarantee the continuous retransmission of television programs 
transmitted by a provider of television services with unrestricted access … for the transmission of which the provider of television services 
requires no charge.” Th e fi rst reaction by the Minister of Economic Aff airs and Communication was that television service providers already 
had the right to collect royalties. However, in autumn 2012, Parliament amended the Article, granting free-to-air channels the right to collect 
royalties.
22. Eff ective as of January 2011.
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television. Overall, online news services (provided by both established media and “pure-play” outlets) have 
demonstrated the potential to diversify the overall news off er in Estonia, but this potential has yet to be 
fully realized.
1.3 News Providers
1.3.1 Leading Sources of News
1.3.1.1 Print Media
Postimees and Õhtuleht are among the most read national newspapers. But regional and local papers serve as 
an important source of news in Estonia. Newspaper circulation as a whole has experienced a slight decline 
during the past fi ve years, while traffi  c to the websites of newspapers has been growing. By the beginning of 
2010, unique visitor fi gures for the Postimees site almost equaled that of its print circulation, while online 
traffi  c generated by the business daily Äripäev exceeded its print circulation.
Table 5.
Newspaper titles’ reach (% of adult population), 2005–2010
Newspaper Q1 2005 Q1 2006 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 2010
Postimees 22.0 24.4 21.9 22.6 22.6 19.2
(SL) Õhtuleht 24.3 26.0 22.6 22.0 19.3 17.1
Eesti Päevaleht 15.3 12.4 13.8 12.8 12.5 10.3
Äripäev 7.1 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.9 4.0
Molodezh Estonii (Russian) 6.8 5.8 4.5 3.9 3.0 n/a
Postimees (Russian) n/a 5.6 5.3 6.0 5.7 5.6
Vesti Dnya (Russian) 4.7 4.8 4.2 3.4 2.9 n/a
Local papers (aggregated)23 33.2 33.4 32.0 31.8 30.0 26.1
Notes: In the absence of yearly averages, quarterly data are presented; n/a: not available
Source: TNS Emor. Readership of an average issue as a percentage of the total audience. 100 percent equals 1,050,000 inhabitants 
aged 15–74, purchased directly from TNS Emor
1.3.1.2 Online
Th e Russian-language version of the online news service Delfi 24 has experienced rapid growth in readership, while 
several other Russian-language print dailies ceased operating in 2009, mostly due to economic reasons coupled 
with the growth of Delfi . However, Postimees’ Russian-language title has maintained the same level of coverage 
since its launch in 2005. Its online counterpart has also maintained its coverage since its launch in 2007.
23. Th is aggregation includes the following local outlets: Harju Elu, Hiiu Leht, Järva Teataja, Koit, Lääne Elu, Meie Maa, Nädaline, Põhjarannik, 
Pärnu Postimees, Sakala, Severnoye Poberezhye (Russian), Tartu Postimees, Valgamaalane, Virumaa Teataja, Vooremaa, Võrumaa Teataja. 
24. By March 2012, the editorial board of Delfi  had merged with the board of the second-biggest daily, Eesti Päevaleht. Delfi  continues to provide 
online news content and Eesti Päevaleht continues in print. Estonian and Russian national versions of Delfi  have separate newsrooms, and their 
output is not identical. Delfi  is a cross-border venture based in the Estonian capital, and operating also in Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine. 
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Th e public service broadcaster, Estonian Public Broadcasting (Eesti Rahvusringhääling, ERR) launched its 
website Uudised.err.ee in 2006 (in Estonian), which was followed by a Russian-language site in 2007 and 
an English-language one in 2010. Even though the reach of Uudised.err.ee remained only a fraction of that 
commanded by Delfi  in 2010, it still serves as a reliable, though not exclusive, source for commercial radio 
news services.25 
Table 6.
News websites’ reach (% of adult population), 2005–2010
Online portal Q1 2005 Q1 2006 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 2010
Delfi .ee 10.8 12.3 15.3 16.5 18.4 18.1
Delfi .ee (Russian) 2.5 3.9 5.1 6.2 7.9 8.1
Postimees.ee 5.4 6.2 9.1 12.6 18.2 17.9
Postimees.ee (Russian) n/a n/a n/a 2.2 3.0 3.0
Epl.ee 4.0 5.1 6.3 6.7 9.5 8.3
Ohtuleht.ee 4.3 5.7 5.4 9.1 12.6 13.4
Aripaev.ee 0.7 1.3 2.1 3.3 5.0 4.8
Err.ee26 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.7 3.2
Notes: In the absence of yearly averages, quarterly data are presented; n/a: not available
Source: TNS Emor. Readership of an average issue as a percentage of the total audience. 100 percent equals 1,050,000 inhabitants 
aged 15–74
Distinguishing between commercially oriented and non-commercial news providers is diffi  cult as the 
borderlines appear to be blurred, due to the relatively small scale of the media market and the resulting 
merging of formats. Using qualitative analysis, commercial features can at times be found in outlets that 
defi ne themselves as “quality papers” (Postimees, Eesti Päevaleht), and vice versa. Among the daily newspapers, 
Õhtuleht has outlined itself as a tabloid and the same applies to its online version. Most of the online 
portals maintain celebrity news sections and other features of a commercial character alongside regular non-
commercial news. 
1.3.1.3 Television
According to Eurobarometer, 85 percent of people in Estonia watch television every day or almost every 
day.27 Th e average daily viewing time exceeds 4 hours a day.28 Th e most watched channels are local, terrestrial, 
25. Th e news bulletin items on commercial radio channels are very often based on open online news services, such as the above-mentioned Uudised.
err.ee or Postimees.ee. Many radio stations judge that the pay-newswire Baltic News Service (BNS) is too expensive. Levels of original news 
production are mainly low, except for Radio Kuku.
26. ERR’s online news services—Uudised.err.ee, as well as News.err.ee and Rus.err.ee—occur as sub-pages within the main corporate home page, 
Err.ee. 
27. Eurobarometer survey, “Estonia national report,” autumn 2010, at http://ec.europa.eu/eesti/pdf/eurobarometre/eb74_estonia_national__re-
port_fi nal.pdf (in Estonian, accessed 25 February 2013) (hereafter, Eurobarometer, “Estonia national report”).
28. Data for January 2013, by TNS Emor.
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large, and old. However, the introduction of new digital options (both national and global channels) has 
decreased their shares by 6 or more percentage points over the last six years. By 2012, the shares of large local 
broadcasters were broadly equal, while the public channel ETV had reinforced its position among the most 
watched channels, with ETV2 showing particular progress. Increasing parity can be observed also among 
shares of the channels preferred by Russian-speaking audiences (PBK, NTV Mir, RTR Planeta). Smaller 
newcomers and niche channels have also established themselves.
Table 7.
TV channels’ daily share  of total viewing time (%), November 2006–November 2012
Channel
November 
2006
November
2007
November 
2008
November 
2009
November 
2010
November 
2011
November 
2012
ETV 17.1 15.3 15.4 15.3 14.8 14.6 16.3
Kanal 2 24.8 23.7 20.9 18.8 17.2 17.2 16.5
TV 3 18.0 18.1 18.2 16.1 13.3 12.8 12.0
ETV2 n/a n/a 0.4 1.3 2.1 2.9 2.7
Kanal 11 n/a n/a 1.1 1.6 2.5 2.0 1.6
TV 6 n/a n/a 1.1 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.0
Seitse n/a 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Tallinna TV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.2 0.5
PBK 11.1 14.2 12.2 12.4 10.9 10.6 8.7
NTV Mir 2.4 2.4 3.3 2.8 4.2 4.4 5.1
RTR Planeta 3.9 2.8 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.6 3.9
National Geographic n/a n/a n/a 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Fox Life n/a n/a n/a 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8
Note: n/a: not available
Source: TNS Emor, TV Audience Survey, universal, age four and above
1.3.1.4 Radio
People in Estonia are radio enthusiasts: 66 percent listen to radio every day or almost every day.29 As to the 
linguistic divide, Estonians listen to radio slightly more than Russian speakers. Th e average daily listening 
time is 3 hours 40 minutes,30 which has not changed much over the years. Estonians aged 12–74 keep 
listening to 3.2 radio stations. Over 50 percent of respondents in the MeeMa Survey claim to listen to radio 
news; 32 percent do this frequently.31
29. Eurobarometer, “Estonia national report.”
30. Data from autumn 2012 by TNS Emor, “Raadioauditooriumi ülevaade 2012. Aasta sügisel” (Overview of Radio Audiences in Autumn 2012), 
at http://www.emor.ee/raadioauditooriumi-ulevaade-2012-aasta-sugisel (accessed 20 February 2013).
31. “MeeMa Survey.” Questions about radio were put only to Estonian-speaking respondents.
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Table 8.
Radio listening (stations primarily with talk format) daily reach (%), 2005–2012
Channel
Q2 
2005
Q2 
2006
Q2 
2007
Q2 
2008
Q2 
2009
Q2 
2010
Q2 
2011
Q2 
2012
Vikerraadio: Prime channel of the PSB, 
mainly talk and news format
24.8 22.3 21.5 23.2 21.4 21.8 23.2 20.3
Radio 4: PSB radio channel in Russian, 
mainly talk and news format
13.9 14.0 13.8 13.2 12.6 10.6 11.1 10.4
Kuku: Prime talk and news channel 
among the private stations (Trio LSL 
Group)
5.7 5.9 7.0 5.7 5.3 6.1 6.0 5.7
Other radio stations 61.3 60.3 61.1 62.9 62.3 62.1 62.2 60.6
Source: TNS Emor Radio Diary Survey, participants aged 12–74
Th e prime sources of radio news and current aff airs coverage (the public service broadcaster’s Vikerraadio, 
Russian-language Radio 4, and the private Kuku) have maintained their listenership. Th e diff erences between 
the channels’ reach are a result of, among other things, their varied footprints. Given that the PSB has 100 
percent coverage guaranteed by law, Kuku broadcasts if frequencies are available—and they can be exploited 
profi tably. 
1. 3.2 Television News Programs
News bulletins have been predominantly produced by the largest television channels (ETV, Kanal 2, and 
TV 3). Digitization has not yet changed their output qualitatively. Some niche channels also produce news 
bulletins, including the newly launched municipal Tallinn Television, but many of them fi ll the news slots 
with formal content (text-TV) just to meet the requirements of the law. Th us, the newcomers launched as a 
result of digitization have not contributed to diversifying the total news output.
Th e changes in ratings during the last fi ve years are insignifi cant. Th e exception was the Russian-language 
newscast of the public service broadcaster, which was switched from the fi rst channel to the recently launched 
second channel, and experienced a huge drop in its already low ratings as a result. Since May 2010, the 
bulletin has been duplicated on TV 3+ in a bid to enlarge the audience. Th e ratings for 2010 showed a slight 
drop for the newscasts of all channels. However, there is not enough hard evidence to link this to any specifi c 
cause. Inter alia, the increase in internet news consumption may be one cause, as well as the eff ect of the 
economic recession. 
Th e public service ETV’s “Aktuaalne kaamera” (Actual Camera) newscast has been in tight competition 
with Kanal 2’s infotainment show “Reporter.” TV 3’s newscast lags slightly behind. As to the schedule, the 
newscasts of Kanal 2 and TV 3 run simultaneously, albeit with seasonal variations. 
With respect to the Russian-speaking community, the newscasts broadcast on Pervyi Baltiiski Kanal originating 
from Russia (and rebroadcast in all the Baltic countries) are the most watched. But as the data by TNS Emor 
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reveal, the half-hour local Estonian news slot has higher ratings than the central newscast from Moscow. Th e 
Russian-language newscast of the ETV lags far behind, as the overall audience share for Estonian-language 
channels among the Russian-speaking community is low. Switching the Russian “Aktualnaya kamera” to 
digital ETV2 also served as a reason for the sudden drop in viewing fi gures in 2009. According to several 
surveys, the majority of the audience for the Russian-language programming on ETV is made up of Estonians. 
Table 9.
Ratings of major newscasts (%), 2005–2010
TV channel Newscast March 
2005
March 
2006
March 
2007
March 
2008
March 
2009
March 
2010
Eesti Televisioon 
(ETV)
“Aktuaalne kaamera” 14.9 13.0 12.4 11.3 13.4 11.8
“Aktualnaya kamera” 
(Russian language)
3.5 3.8 3.6 3.7 N.A 0.8
Kanal 2 “Reporter” 12.6 12.7 13.9 12.8 14.5 11.7
TV 3 “Seitsmesed/TV 3 uudised” 11.0 12.2 8.1 11.5 10.2 8.6
Pervyi Baltiiski Kanal 
(Russian)
“Vremya” (from Russia) 4.1 5.0 4.8 5.9 6.3 5.4
“News of Estonia” 6.8 5.8 5.8 6.5 8.0 7.1
Note: In the absence of yearly averages, data available for a specifi c month are presented
Source: TNS Emor. TV Audience Survey, universal, age four and above. Percentage of total audience average per minute
1.3.3 Impact of Digital Media on Good-quality News
Qualitative improvement as a result of digitization cannot yet be observed in news output. Th e requirements 
deriving from the specifi cs of ratings competition in the digital age lead to channels producing more news 
with less quality, as the expansion of technological means has not been accompanied by an expansion in the 
labor force.
However, given the coincidence of economic recession with digitization over the last fi ve years, it is hard to 
isolate and measure the specifi c impact of the latter on news quality. Th is applies both to commercial and non-
commercial output, regardless of the channel. As digital technology tends to facilitate news production, the 
lackluster quality of the news content is presumably to be explained, in the fi rst instance, by the discouraging 
fi nancial conditions. 
1.4 Assessments 
Th e digital news outlets have changed the total news off er very little. On the one hand, the news fl ow via 
digital media, especially online news, has increased the total news output. However, this has not increased 
the quality and, indeed, may have contributed to a deterioration. Digital news lacks universally recognized 
criteria in news reporting, such as accuracy and comprehensiveness.
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Th e transition of television broadcasting to the digital mode has so far not produced any diversifi cation or 
qualitative change in the news off er of television channels. Th e infl uential news bulletins are provided by 
the main generalist national channels (ETV, Kanal 2, and TV 3), while the majority of digitally introduced 
niche channels meet news quota obligations in formal terms only: they provide text-based slides or reruns of 
newscasts produced by the parent mainstream channel without contributing anything original.
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2. Digital Media and Public or 
 State-administered Broadcasters
2.1 Public Service and State Institutions
2.1.1 Overview of Public Service Media; News and Current Affairs Output
Public service broadcasting was instituted to replace the established state broadcasting operators by adopting 
the Broadcasting Act in 1994.32 Th e then separate public radio and public television were integrated into 
one legal entity—Eesti Rahvusringhääling (ERR)—on 1 July 2007 by the newly adopted Estonian National 
Broadcasting Act, which also concretized the objectives and functions of the public broadcaster. 
Th e relatively high audience shares for PSB in the early 1990s declined rapidly for several reasons: abandoning 
shows of a commercial nature (e.g. the “Dating Game”); foreign owners’ investment in the programming 
of commercial channels and the subsequent rise in competition between the channels; several managerial 
errors at public service television, predominantly due to insuffi  cient state funding for the PSB. However, 
cancellation of advertising on ETV (the television arm of ERR) as of July 2002 worked in favor of the public 
service image which, as experts have concluded, should not be based on high ratings but on infl uence and 
credibility.33
By 2012, ETV had regained the highest daily share among television channels,34 and the second channel 
ETV2 has shown some increase in viewership over recent years. In 2011, only some 12 percent of the 
Russian-speaking community claimed to watch ETV almost every day.35 However, ETV attracts a relatively 
high proportion of educated audiences.
32. For a more detailed background, see Loit, Television across Europe, pp. 577–578.
33. See Loit, Television across Europe; also H. Shein, “Rahvusringhäälingu kuvandiraamistik: taustategurid ja muud hüpoteesid” (Image Framework of 
the PSB: Background Factors and Other Hypotheses), on the blog Memokraat.ee, 7 February 2010, at http://memokraat.ee/2010/02/rahvusring
haalingu-kuvandiraamistik-taust (accessed 10 January 2011).
34. TNS Emor, “Teleauditooriumi ülevaade juunikuus 2012” (Survey of the TV Audience in June 2012), news item released on 6 June 2012, at 
http://www.emor.ee/teleauditooriumi-ulevaade-juunikuus-2012 (accessed 20 July 2012).
35. H. Kaldaru, “Eesti elanikkonna meediateemaline arvamusuuring 2011” (Survey of Media-related Opinions of the Estonian Population), om-
nibus survey, November 2011, by Turu-uuringute AS for ERR, at http://err.ee/fi les/Uuringud_Meediaaruanne_2011.pdf (accessed 10 January 
2013).
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ETV2 was at its initial stage envisaged for programming in Russian,36 especially after the “Bronze Soldier” 
riots,37 and is currently running almost all the Russian-language production in Estonia, but it has failed to 
attract a signifi cant proportion of the Russian-speaking audience. Th e management is considering giving 
up plans of having anything more than one Russian-language news bulletin, the ratings for which are also 
low.38 Th e ERR 2011 Annual Report puts the matter simply: “Russian-language programming could only be 
produced with the help of single-purpose project fi nancing.”39 (Th is programming consisted of two talkshows, 
reduced to one a week in the autumn.) 
Table 10.
Annual average audience share of PSB TV channels (%), 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ETV 17.1 17.3 16.4 15.6 15.7 15.3
Estonians 25.0 25.5 25.1 23.5 23.7 23.0
Russian-speakers 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.7
Higher education 20.8 21.1 21.0 20.5 21.1 21.1
ETV2 — — — 0.2 1.1 2.1
Estonians — — — 0.3 1.5 3.1
Russian speakers — — — 0 0.4 0.4
Higher education — — — 0.2 1.5 2.5
Source: TNS Emor, sourced from ERR
Research conducted by ERR in 2009 found that slightly more than 70 percent of programming on ETV and 
ETV2 was originated in Estonia, compared to 29.8 percent on Kanal 2, 22.1 percent on TV 3, 11.4 percent 
on Kanal 11, and 5.5 percent on TV 6.40 
Not surprisingly, the proportion of U.S.-originated programs is relatively low among public service 
broadcasters (3.2 percent for ETV and 6.1 percent for ETV2), compared with private channels (29.9 percent 
on Kanal 2, 36.8 percent on Kanal 11, 45.4 percent on TV 3, and 56.4 percent on TV 6).41
36. See “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2010–2013” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2010–2013), adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 3 March 2009, at http://err.ee/fi les/ERRArengukava_2010-2013.pdf (accessed 10 January 2013).
37. Th e government’s April 2007 relocation of a 1947 war memorial to the Soviet army—known as the “Liberator of Tallinn”—triggered two nights 
of riots in Tallinn by members of Estonia’s Russian-speaking community. Experts called for better, more integrative information to be provided 
to the Russian-speaking community. See more in “Th e Last Soviet in Tallinn: Saga of the Bronze Soldier,” at http://www.tallinn-life.com/tallinn/
estonian-russian-relations; Wikipedia; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze_Soldier_of_Tallinn (both accessed 20 July 2012).
38. D. Leitmaa, “Allikmaa: vene kanali ideest tuleks loobuda” (Allikmaa: Th e Idea of a Russian Channel should be Abandoned), Eesti Päevaleht, 
5 March 2011.
39. ERR, “ERR majandusaasta aruanne 2011” (ERR Annual Report 2011), at http://err.ee/fi les/ERR_aastaaruanne2011_kinnitatud.pdf (accessed 
10 January 2013).
40. Data by ERR Research Center, retrieved from the ERR Annual Report 2009. Th e textual forms (text-TV, split-screen, and schedule displaying) 
have not been included in the overall volume of programming.
41. Data by ERR Research Center, retrieved from the ERR Annual Report 2009. 
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Th e Development Plan for 2011–2014 underlines the PSB’s role “to shape civic society by framing the 
public discussion fi eld.” Th is somewhat passionately phrased aim is to be achieved by providing independent, 
instant, and comprehensive news “to equip the public with resources for political decision-making,” providing 
knowledge, and “carrying [a] continuous cultural fl ow” of facts and experiences.42 Th e plan also emphasizes 
journalistic quality as fundamental to the public interest. 
According to respondents in a credible survey,43 ETV1 was singled out for outstanding programming in 
political issues and current aff airs (according to 54 percent of all respondents) and cultural topics (49 percent). 
Documentaries (42 percent) and news and sports (39 percent) were also widely commended. Th ese trends 
were observed as of 2008, according to the survey. 
Concurrently, feature fi lms, serials, and especially entertainment were considered to be the specialty of 
commercial channels. Th e best entertainment came from Kanal 2 (according to 37 percent of respondents). 
But the survey also revealed divergent preferences between the Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities, 
with the latter considering PBK as the best channel for all genres.
Th e quantity and quality of the output of news and current aff airs have not changed signifi cantly over the 
last fi ve years. Th e most signifi cant change was the launch by the ERR of the online news service Uudised.
err.ee in 2006, which helped boost the share of news and information in the total output of the broadcaster.
Table 11.
Share of news and current aff airs programs on ETV and ETV2 (%), 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ETV Hours % Hours % Hours % Hours % Hours % Hours %
News 532 8.2 533 6.1 526 6.0 546 6.2 444 5.1 448 5.1
Online text news on screen 0.0 0.0 1,767 20.3 1,797 20.5 1,702 19.4 2,115 24.1 2,054 23.4
Information 449 6.9 463 5.3 575 6.6 548 6.2 557 6.4 535 6.1
Factual 674 10.3 707 8.1 888 10.1 720 8.2 878 10.0 661 7.5
Total no. of hours 6,523 100 8706 100 8,760 100 8,784 100% 8,760 100 8,760 100
ETV2
n/a
Hours % Hours % Hours %
News 0 0.0 143 1.6 166 1.9
Online text news on screen 2,730 77.8 5,943 67.8 4,621 52.8
Information 11 0.3 182 2.1 314 3.6
Factual 2 0.1 274 3.1 480 5.5
Total no. of hours 3,509 100 8,760 100 8,760 100
Source: ERR
42. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2011–2014” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2011–2014), adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 2 March 2010, at http://err.ee/fi les/ERR_arengukava_2011-2014.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011).
43. Turu-uuringute AS, “Meedia 2010,” audience survey of the population aged 15–74, conducted at the request of ERR, at http://err.ee/fi les/
Uuringud_Eesti_elanike_meediauuring2010.pdf (accessed 14 March 2011) (hereafter, Turu-uuringute AS, “Meedia 2010”).
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Th e newscasts provide a generalist choice of news. Qualitatively, there has been no notable change in the 
ETV’s news off er in recent years. Th e newsroom employs several local reporters across the country but 
only three permanent reporters abroad (in Brussels, Moscow, and the United States; reporters are planned 
for Helsinki (by 2013) and Berlin (2014)).44 ETV2 provides news in sign language (for those with hearing 
disability) and in Russian. Th e night slots have been fi lled by online text. As ETV2 does not have a 24-hour 
schedule, the share of these text-news services is relatively large.
As ERR does not include advertising in its broadcasting output,45 the commercial competition does not 
immediately infl uence its day-to-day operations. Hanno Tomberg, a member of ERR’s management 
board, says that competition has had no infl uence on ETV’s programming choices.46 According to him, 
ongoing market fragmentation requires the PSB to fi nd ways to reach minorities and various interest groups. 
However, the annual Development Plans says little about how to achieve this. Th e Plan for 2011–2014 
suggests developing a daily bilingual tele-novella by 2013.47 Th e Plan for 2012–2015 assigns the date for the 
tele-novella to 2014, expanding its aim to include bringing together national groups and increasing social 
cohesion.48 Only the Development Plan for 2012–2015 addresses “minorities and various interest groups” 
more broadly: “off ering prompt and daily useful information about life in Estonia, and opportunities for 
interactive debate on lively issues in the Russian language.”49 For this as yet modest ambition, the Plan 
envisages the following activities:
 to consolidate and unify the daily Russian-language program zone on ETV2 (by 2012) across the week
 to launch a weekly review in Russian (by 2013)
 to broadcast annually at least 250 hours of original programs in Russian
 to provide programs on ETV2 with optional subtitles and add topics relevant to the Russian audience
 to decide upon further developments for Russian programming
Th e Development Plan for 2013–2016 remains quite general about the issue, stating that “there is a continual 
need for eff orts to make the Estonian media space acceptable also for the Russian-speaking community,” and 
indicating that “programs with Russian subtitles, the Russian online news service, Russian television news 
and some Russian-language television debates shall continue.”50 A new emphasis has been put on online 
44. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2012–2015” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2012–2015), adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 2 February 2011, at http://err.ee/fi les/Arengukava_2012-2015.pdf (accessed 20 February 2013).
45. According to the National Broadcasting Act, Article 11, ERR shall not transmit advertising and teleshopping and shall not receive support from 
sponsorship, except with the approval of the National Broadcasting Council in cases related to the broadcasting rights of international major 
events acquired via the European Broadcasting Union, or cultural or sports events of signifi cant public interest.
46. Email interview with Hanno Tomberg, member of the ERR management board, 11 March 2011. 
47. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2011–2014” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2011–2014), adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 2 March 2010, at http://err.ee/fi les/ERR_arengukava_2011-2014.pdf (accessed 10 January 2013).
48. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2012–2015” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2012–2015), adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 2 February 2011, at http://err.ee/fi les/Arengukava_2012-2015.pdf (accessed 10 January 2013).
49. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2012–2015” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2012–2015), p. 26, adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 2 February 2011, at http://err.ee/fi les/Arengukava_2012-2015.pdf (accessed 10 January 2013).
50. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2013–2016” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2013–2016), p. 17, adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 27 February 2012, at http://err.ee/fi les/ERR_arengukava_2013-2016.pdf (accessed 10 January 2013).
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environments, enabling interactive discussions in Russian. All the plans have usually been implemented 
in accordance with (rather meager) fi nancial resources, as prescribed in the National Broadcasting Act.51 
Additional fi nancing needs to be provided for these plans to be fulfi lled.
2.1.2 Digitization and Services
Digitization allowed ETV to launch its second channel in 2008. ETV2 started with transmissions from the 
Beijing Olympic Games. After this, the channel served as a children’s program outlet with various shows from 
the archives (as there was no suffi  cient funding added to develop and maintain fully original programming). 
In this role—as a channel of children’s programs—ETV2 has already established its importance. Although 
in 2009 Russian-language programming was transferred to ETV2, the channel retained a focus on children. 
Th e audience survey of media consumption for 2010 indicates that 11 percent of respondents cited ETV2 
as the best provider of children’s programs.52 Th is was a lot compared with ETV2’s ratings of 0–3 percent 
for other genres. However, by the time the survey was carried out, the channel had already cut its children 
programming. 
Instead, according to the evaluation by the PSB management,53 ETV2 has diversifi ed its programming and 
that of ERR as a whole. Archived programs in niche genres such as original television theater have been given 
a wider audience platform compared with their original broadcasts. At the same time, the channel is credited 
with serving niche interests primarily through documentaries and alternative feature fi lms targetted at specifi c 
audiences.
As indicated in section 1.3.1, ERR launched an online news service in 2006, Uudised.err.ee (in Estonian), 
which was shortly followed by services in Russian and English. Uudised.err.ee serves as a reliable, though not 
exclusive, source for commercial radio news output. 
It provides general news and information in several specifi c areas (science, elections, sports, etc.). Th e 
Development Plan envisages that ERR’s online presence will have an educational as well as informational 
role.54 ERR also intends to develop its websites as parallel supplementary resources to radio and television 
programs, in order to enable both linear and non-linear consumption and provide accessible archives of its 
content. Th e economic recession forced ERR to improve the structure of the portals’ editorial units, making 
the output compatible in Estonian and Russian languages.55 In fact, the English portal is the only daily news 
source about Estonia in that language.
51. “Public Broadcasting shall transmit programs which, ‘within the limits of the possibilities of Public Broadcasting, meet the information needs of 
all sections of the population, including minorities’” (Article 5, section 1, subsection 8; emphasis added).
52. Turu-uuringute AS, “Meedia 2010.”
53. Email interview with Hanno Tomberg, member of the management board, 11 March 2011.
54. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2012–2015” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2012–2015), adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 8 February 2011, at http://err.ee/fi les/Arengukava_2012-2015.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011).
55. ERR Annual Report 2009. 
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Table 12.
Breakdown of ETV and ETV2 programming by genre (%), 2011
Genre ETV ETV2
News 5.4 1.9
Online text news on screen 24.7 47.3
Information 5.8 3.5
Factual 8.4 5.1
Culture, education, science, religion 6.9 10.9
Infotainment 11.3 1.7
Sports 3.4 1.6
Music performances 3.2 3.7
Entertainment 5.1 2.7
Fiction 22.8 19.4
Self-advertising, sponsorship, and other 3.0 2.2
Total no. of hours 8,760 8,760
Source: ERR Annual Report 2011
2.1.3 Government Support
State funding of PSB increased between 2006 and 2008 as a result of the Estonian National Broadcasting 
merger in 2007, which provided for the launch of ETV2. However, the economic recession resulted in a 10 
percent reduction in state funding, and a 16 percent fall in ERR’s total income between 2008 and 2010.
According to the evaluation by the ERR management board, the state has in no way aff ected the independence 
or diversity of the PSB service. Th e content-related decisions have been made by the statutory organs of ERR. 
No legal advantages or privileges have been off ered to the PSB to develop digital services. On the contrary: 
according to an evaluation by Andres Jõesaar, a former chair of the National Broadcasting Council, the 
private channels were off ered more favorable terms for digital switch-over. In particular, the broadcasting 
license fees for television broadcasters were waived, and the new digital channels (TV 6 and Kanal 11) were 
granted licenses for free.56 Th is waiver was justifi ed on the basis that digital programming can be disseminated 
by cable, IPTV, and satellite—without employing terrestrial networks.
2.1.4 Public Service Media and Digital Switch-over
Digitization has caused television audience fragmentation even among Estonia’s relatively small population. 
Nevertheless, the combined audience reach of the PSB television channels (ETV and ETV2) has increased 
since digital switch-over, as was clearly seen in 2012, while that of the major private broadcasters (Kanal 2, 
56. A. Jõesaar, “Raha vs. vaadatavus: Eesti telemaastik 2010” (Money vs. Viewership: Estonian TV Landscape 2010), in Eesti Akadeemilise Ajakir-
janduse Seltsi aastaraamat 2009/2010 (Yearbook of the Academic Society of Estonian Journalism 2009/2010), Tartu Ulikooli Kirjastus, Tartu, 
2011, p. 112 (hereafter, Jõesaar, “Raha vs. vaadatavus”).
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Kanal 11, TV 3, and TV 6) has decreased.57 While it is too early to make further assessments of the impact 
of digital switch-over, it may be surmised that ETV’s sudden increase in popularity is related to its perceived 
professional standards, the public appetite for serious reporting and analysis of the economic crisis and its 
impact, and the funding challenges facing commercial broadcasters, which aff ect the quality of their news 
output. 
2.2 Public Service Provision
2.2.1 Perception of Public Service Media
Although ERR was legally constituted as a public institution in 1994, and the concept of public broadcasting 
was introduced in 1989, ERR and its entities—radio and television—are still often referred to as “state 
broadcasting” (television, radio). Linguistic distinctions apart,58 the broader concept of public service 
broadcasting may seem unfamiliar to the general public. Even politicians in parliamentary debates at times 
refer to “state television.” Media coverage and media reports also tend to adopt this term. Th e notion of state 
over public broadcasting is further underlined by the fact that ERR is funded directly from the state budget 
and there is no license fee payable by viewers.
Th e television analyst, recent chair of the National Broadcasting Council, and former Director General of 
ETV, Hagi Shein, recommends that ERR should fi nd allies for improving the image of public media and for 
having spokespersons besides the ERR employees themselves. ETV seemed to be successful in this during 
the “rule” of Ilmar Raag (2002–2005), but ERR’s management has since lost many of its allies, according 
to Mr Shein. 
Th e journalist Andres Laasik, on the other hand, underlines the necessity to reach younger generations, as has 
been achieved by the Finnish public broadcaster, Yleisradio (YLE).59 According to the 2010 research, trust in 
ERR was the highest among the over-60 age group (the number of respondents “fully trusting” among this 
group exceeds more than twice the number in the 15–19 age group). Also, ETV is relatively more valued in 
all genres by people with higher education.60
2.2.2 Public Service Provision in Commercial Media
Under Estonian legislation the only type of media regulated by law is broadcasting. No content prescription 
applies to print media or the internet. 
57. H. Tomberg, “Kas digipööre oli edukas?” (Was the Digi-turn Successful?), Postimees, 18 January 2011.
58. Th e prefi x “riigi-” (state) sounds shorter and sharper in Estonian than the longer “avalik-oiguslik” (public), despite its recent abbreviation to 
“avaoiguslik.”
59. A. Laasik, “Vajatakse nooruslikku arengukava” (A Youthful Development Plan Needed), Eesti Päevaleht, 17 March 2011.
60. Turu-uuringute AS, “Meedia 2010.”
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A news quota of 5 percent of total programming applies both to commercial radio and television services, 
although exceptions can be made for thematic channels (music, fi lm, or sports). Commercial television 
channels are also obligated to ensure that 10 percent of their monthly output consists of their own original 
productions and at least half of this is transmitted during prime time between 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. (again, 
with exceptions for thematic channels). Furthermore, news, sports events and games, advertising, teletext 
services, and teleshopping cannot be included in the quota.61
Commercial radio and television outlets are also obliged, like the PSB, to immediately and without charge 
transmit emergency notices, which may include offi  cial announcements by Parliament, the president, and 
the government in the event of threats to national security or constitutional order; or information that is 
necessary to protect human lives, health, and security or to prevent material damage or danger to them, as 
well as for the prevention or reduction of environmental damage.62
2.3 Assessments 
As has been underlined by Mr Jõesaar, digital switch-over primarily embraces a quantitative dimension: 
making frequency resources usage more eff ective, freeing up part of the analog resource for broadband 
communication facilities, and concurrently extending the number of channels for television as well. However, 
this has not corresponded to a qualitative change in PSB output.63 Th e offi  cial documents of ERR indicate 
that the public broadcaster has been underfi nanced and needs additional professional resources.64 Th us, 
much of the PSB output springs from the enthusiasm of the broadcaster(s). 
Nevertheless, the launch of ETV2 in 2008 has provided opportunities for the PSB to develop a more diverse 
package of television programs. ETV2 addresses smaller and more specifi c audiences, providing Russian-
language programming, shows for children, and programs about science, education, and culture.65 Launching 
online news services in Russian and English has also enabled the furthering of public service goals through 
multimedia and non-linear services.
With respect to measurable indicators, ERR has rather gained than lost from the digitization process.
2012 saw a dramatic rise in ratings for PSB television. Th is may merely be the result of a short-term eff ect of 
the economic recession on television consumption. Alternatively, it may yet prove to mark an enduring trend. 
61. Media Services Act, Article 8.
62. Media Services Act, Article 18.
63. Jõesaar, “Raha vs. vaadatavus.”
64. As assessed in “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2012–2015” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2012–2015), adopt-
ed by the Council of National Broadcasting on 8 February 2011, at http://err.ee/fi les/Arengukava_2012-2015.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011).
65. “Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu arengukava 2012–2015” (Development Plan for Estonian National Broadcasting 2012–2015), adopted by the 
Council of National Broadcasting on 8 February 2011, at http://err.ee/fi les/Arengukava_2012-2015.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011).
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Th e structural reform of ERR in 2007 also brought clarifi cations in the law about the remit and functions of 
the PSB. However, the elaborated functions include those to be performed in the case of additional fi nancing, 
e.g. programming for minorities. Th e digital switch-over in 2010 was purely technical and imposed no 
additional legal content obligations on ERR.
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3. Digital Media and Society
3.1 User-Generated Content (UGC)
3.1.1 UGC Overview
Th e majority of Estonia’s 10 most popular websites provide users with at least one, but usually several, 
opportunities for user-generated content (UGC) creation (see Table 13).66 Only the most popular search 
engines like Google.com, Google.ee, and the e-bank service by Swedbank provide no UGC opportunities.67 
Table 13.
Th e 10 most popular UGC websites, January 2013
Website Ranking Type of site User information for Estonia
Facebook 3 International social network 508,500 users*
YouTube 4 Sharing and uploading videos n/a
Wikipedia 8 A free collaboratively built encyclopedia n/a
Vkontakte 9 Russian social network n/a
Blogspot 11 Blogging platform n/a
Odnoklassniki 12 Russian social network n/a
LinkedIn 27 International social network n/a
LiveJournal 34 Blogging platform n/a
WordPress 41 Microblogging site 260,994**
Twitter 43 International microblogging site n/a
Notes: * Facebakers.com; ** Quantcast.com; n/a: not available
Source: Alexa.com, 21 January 2013
66. See http://www.alexa.com (accessed 18 January 2013).
67. See http://www.alexa.com (accessed 18 January 2013).
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Th e most popular social media websites in Estonia, i.e. sites that are exclusively user-created are Facebook, 
YouTube, Wikipedia, and a social networking site, Vkontakte, which is intended for Russian-speaking 
individuals.68 Th e other most frequently visited websites in Estonia are run by established media such as Delfi .
ee and Postimees.ee.69 Th e former is the biggest online news and entertainment website, which also off ers 
a variety of UGC opportunities to engage in civic journalism, comment on news stories, and participate in 
forum discussions, online dating, and chat-rooms. 
Postimees.ee is an online version of the daily Postimees, off ering online business news, foreign news, 
entertainment, sports, and other news that users can comment upon. Th e seventh-ranked most popular 
website according to Alexa.com is Mail.ru portal,70 the largest free e-mail service for Russian-speaking 
individuals. In addition to providing a personal e-mail account, it off ers an opportunity to upload photos, 
videos, and fi les, keep a blog, as well as to socialize via instant messaging, create a social network profi le, and 
play online games.
3.1.2 Social Networks
Th e results of the “MeeMa Survey” indicate substantial diff erences in the Social Networking Site (SNS) 
preferences of Russian- and Estonian-speakers. Facebook is currently the most popular site among Estonian 
speakers (attracting 83 per cent of Estonian-speaking social media users).71 In fact, with 508,500 users, almost 
40 percent of Estonia’s population (and 51 percent of those with internet access) has a profi le on Facebook.72 
Th e second most important SNS among Estonian-speaking internet users was Orkut.com (27.5 percent).73 
Th e most popular SNS among Russian speakers was Odnoklassniki.ru (ranked 12th on Alexa.com), used by 
80 percent of the sample, and Vkontakte.ru (9th on Alexa.com), with 75 percent having a profi le there.74 
Both of these sites are strongly oriented toward the Russian-speaking community and have become immensely 
popular in Russia and other Eastern European countries.
Th e fi ndings of the MediaCom survey from 2010 indicate that both Estonian- and Russian-speaking 
Facebook users are motivated to use the site to keep in contact with their friends.75 A comparative analysis 
of Facebook user practices of the Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities suggests that the Estonian 
speakers engage in a wider variety of practices. For instance, compared with the Russian-speaking Facebook 
users, Estonian-speaking users (49 percent) were more likely to regard the site as an important platform for 
obtaining information, rather than just a resource for social activity. Th ey are also more active in joining 
68. See http://www.alexa.com (accessed 18 January 2013).
69. See http://www.alexa.com (accessed 18 January 2013).
70. See http://www.alexa.com (accessed 18 January 2013).
71. “MeeMa Survey,” database.
72. See http://www.facebakers.com (accessed 21 January 2013).
73. “MeeMa Survey,” database.
74. “MeeMa Survey,” database.
75. P. Kupenko and T. Ülesoo, MediaCom Survey report, Tallinn: MediaCom, 2010 (hereafter, Kupenko and Ülesoo).
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communities and the web pages of institutions, brands, and organizations (47 percent), or taking part in 
social media marketing campaigns (40 percent).76 
Th e MediaCom survey suggests that people are motivated to join specifi c SNS communities and fan pages of 
organizations and companies when they consider the information provided on these pages interesting enough 
(56 percent), when the theme or topic under discussion in that community is aligned with their interests or 
hobbies (48 percent), or when the page itself is entertaining and full of interesting information (46 percent). 
Merely expressing an opinion about the organization or brand, however, is not a strong motivation (24 percent).77 
In recent years, the spirit of digital activism has been growing. According to the “MeeMa Survey” results, 11 
percent of social media users have made a post, commented, or asked questions about a theme related to politics 
or politicians; and 23 percent of social media users have invited their “friends” to join a civic engagement initiative 
or community.78 Nevertheless, it has been noted that not all users of such communities are active; rather, their 
involvement in the SNS is mostly passive and referential—more a presence than actual engagement.79
3.1.3 News in Social Media
Th e analysis of the most often visited UGC sites among Estonians indicates that they engage in UGC on 
SNS, where there is a need to fi ll in pre-given formats, but they are also quite active in producing content 
on personal blogs, which require and enable their users to employ more creative skills and freedom. For 
instance, the Fabulous Journalism Award for 2010 was awarded to Daniel Vaarik for an analysis on his blog 
Memokraat. Th e article was about the controversy surrounding the construction of the monument in Tallinn 
dedicated to the victorious Estonian War of Independence (see section 4.3.2).80 
According to the fi ndings of a recent Eurostat survey, 91 percent of Estonian internet users used the net in 
2012 to read online news and newspapers.81 Furthermore, the “MeeMa Survey” found that 35.9 percent of 
social media users have become accustomed to posting links to news stories, commenting on news, or posing 
questions about the news they have read on their SNS profi les. In comparison with the youngest age groups, 
who are most active in commenting and sharing news on social media (45.4 percent of 15–19-year-olds; 44 
per cent of 20–29-year-olds), this activity is much less popular among older social media users (20.8 percent 
of 45–54-year-olds, and 15.4 per cent of 55–64-year-olds).82 
 
76. Kupenko and Ülesoo.
77. Kupenko and Ülesoo.
78. “MeeMa Survey,” database.
79. V. Kalmus et al., “Mapping the terrain of ‘Generation C’: Places and Practices of Online Content Creation Among Estonian Teenagers,” Journal 
of Computer-Mediated Communication, 14(4) (2009), pp. 1257–1282 (hereafter, V. Kalmus et al., “Mapping the terrain of ‘Generation C’,” 
2009).
80. “Oivalise ajakirjanduse preemia pälvis Daniel Vaarik” (Prize for Excellent Journalism Awarded to Daniel Vaarik), Postimees Online, 21 October 
2010, at http://www.postimees.ee/?id=329848 (accessed 10 December 2010).
81. More than half of internet users post messages to social media. See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/4-18122012-AP/
EN/4-18122012-AP-EN.PDF (accessed 21 January 2013). 
82. “MeeMa Survey,” database.
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In addition to commenting on news on social media platforms, various studies suggest that Estonia also 
has a thriving culture of newspaper commenting. Young people in particular participate in this actively: 82 
percent of students read comments on online news at least sometimes, and 43 percent comment on news.83 
Furthermore, most of the students (71 percent) believe that the value of comments lies in the discussion and 
debate they initiate, while 41percent agree that comments help them to understand the news better. 
Estonian citizens are also launching news websites that are solely based on citizen journalism. For instance, a 
non-profi t-making association Estonian Civic Journalism Society (founded in 2010) launched an information 
portal Kylauudis.ee, where people can write their own news stories related to everyday life and events taking 
place in their county.84 A dozen volunteer editors and contributors work for the site, which is visited by 
10,000 unique users per month.85 Activists from the non-profi t organization Uus Maailm (New World) 
launched a community radio called Uue Maailma Raadio (Radio of the New World), which broadcasts live 
once a month.86 Hence, at least in this area, UGC has found its place next to the institutionally provided 
content. 
Despite the fact that thousands of households in Estonia make use of information technology for everyday 
activities and to improve their quality of life, researchers87 indicate that people are still not that actively 
engaged in making use of information technology for the benefi t of civil society. Authors of these studies88 
regard the democratic potential of information and communication technologies in terms of the provision 
of e-services by both national and local governments to be rather good in Estonia. However, Estonian 
citizens are not very active in making use of these opportunities. It has been suggested that people are especially 
reluctant to take part in citizen initiatives, polls, and signing of petitions; participating in online debate and 
forums; communicating with offi  cials and online records management, and so forth.89 Recent studies suggest 
that young people using social media have become increasingly active in civic society activities compared with 
older people and those individuals who are not that active in social media;90 hence, the statement that only 
the most active internet users are regularly engaged in e-participation initiatives still holds true.91
83. V. Kalmus et al., “Mapping the terrain of ‘Generation C’,” 2009.
84. See http://www.kylauudis.ee/kylauudis-ee (accessed 10 December 2010).
85. O. Tammik, “Citizen Journalists Hold Conference,” 2011, at http://news.err.ee/895d0d86-f026-4990-b368-9b26cf8442be (accessed 28 Febru-
ary 2013).
86. See http://www.uusmaailm.ee/raadio.
87. P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, M. Keller, and K. Reinsalu, “Quality of Life and Civic Involvement in Information Society,” Information Society 
Yearbook 2009, 2010, at http://www.riso.ee/en/pub/2009it/#p=1-1-4 (accessed 10 December 2010) (hereafter, Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt et al., 
“Quality of Life and Civic Involvement”).
88. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt et al., “Quality of Life and Civic Involvement,” 2010. 
89. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt et al., “Quality of Life and Civic Involvement,” 2010.
90. “Kodanikualgatust toetavad väärtused ja käitumismustrid Eesti elanikkonnas 2011–2012” (Values and Behaviour Patterns which Support Civic 
Activism amongst the Estonian Population 2011–2012), at http://www.kysk.ee/sisu/10_26918226_Uuringuraport_Kodanikualgatust_toetavad_
vaartused_ja_kaitumismustrid_Eesti_elanikkonnas_2011-2012_uuringu_teostaja_Kodanikeuhiskonna_uurimis-ja_arenduskeskus_Tallinna_
Ulikool.pdf (accessed 26 February 2013).
91. P. Runnel, P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, and K. Reinsalu, “Estonian Tiger Leap from post-communism to the information society: from policy to 
practices,” Journal of Baltic Studies, 40(1) (2009).
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3.2 Digital Activism
3.2.1 Digital Platforms and Civil Society Activism
Social media environments, Facebook in particular, have become popular platforms for allowing the general 
public to express their dislike or show their support of a certain topic. 
One of the most famous campaigns of the kind was launched in April 2011 to show support for Andrus 
Veerpalu, Estonia’s twice Olympic 15-km cross-country ski champion after he tested positive for a banned 
growth hormone. Several Facebook fan communities including “A human-chain to support Andrus Veerpalu,” 
“Andrus Veerpalu is clean,” “Backfi ring on Estonian media,”92 and “We believe Andrus Veerpalu,” the last 
of which was joined by more than 68,000 individuals,93 were created to show support for the athlete. Th e 
failure of attempts to clear the disgraced skier’s name has not changed the attitude of 62,283 supporters of 
the Facebook fan community.94 
92. “Doping Scandal: Are Estonians Sore Losers?.” See http://news.err.ee/sports/afe00ac4-7c65-4af7-b049-2ae325ee6406 (accessed 21 January 
2013). 
93. “Saksamaa portaal imestab ‘Usume Andrus Veerpalu’ kommuuni populaarsuse üle” (German portal is surprised at the popularity of the 
“We believe Andrus Veerpalu” group), at http://sport.postimees.ee/451574/saksamaa-portaal-imestab-usume-andrus-veerpalu-kommuuni-
populaarsuse-ule (accessed 21 January 2013).
94. “We believe Andrus Veerpalu Facebook community,” at http://et-ee.facebook.com/pages/Usume-Andrus-Veerpalu/194487653920408?sk=info 
(accessed 21 January 2013).
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Online and offl ine protests against ACTA
One of the most successful protest attempts generated through social media in recent years has been 
a protest against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Estonians have protested against 
ACTA in several ways. For instance, they created various multimodal platforms—e.g. online games95 
and music videos96—that mocked politicians who supported ACTA (such as Prime Minister Andrus 
Ansip), and actively distributed them through online media. More than 7,200 people signed an 
online petition against ACTA,97 and there were several anti-ACTA communities and events organized 
via Facebook. For instance, more than 4,300 Estonian Facebook users declared their intention to 
take part in the anti-ACTA protest in Tallinn,98 and more than 2,400 in Tartu in February 2012.99 
Even though only around 3,000 protesters actually turned up at the event in Tallinn, the protest was 
named the biggest civic engagement initiative in the history of Estonia since the Singing Revolution 
(1987–1991).100 
According to a recent study, Estonians are most active in joining single-issue support groups on 
Facebook, followed by political party support groups, nationalist, feminist, and sexual minorities, 
environmental and activist movement support groups.101 The most popular online single initiatives 
so far have been “Down with Tallinn TV—money to kindergartens” (14,414 likes),102 which demands 
that the money spent on producing Tallinn TV should be spent on kindergartens; and “A worthy 
salary for a teacher,”103  which supports higher pay for teachers (10,693 likes).
One of the most talked about civic initiatives in Estonia that has made active use of digital technologies has 
been a campaign called “My Estonia—Let’s do it!”104 Th e fi rst event of the initiative, “Let’s do it—Let’s clean 
Estonia,” took place on 3 May 2008 when more than 50,000 volunteers turned out to collect 10,000 tonnes 
95. “Lõbus mäng: Ansip sööb seemneid” (Funny Game: Ansip Eats Seeds), at http://publik.delfi .ee/news/naljad/lobus-mang-ansip-soob-seemneid.
d?id=63899393 (accessed 21 January 2013).
96. “Kuula DJ Fooliumi poliitilist tümakalugu ‘Ansipi ACTA’” (Listen to the political beat-song ‘Ansip’s ACTA’ by DJ Foolium), Õhtuleht online, 
13 February 2012, at http://www.ohtuleht.ee/video/464477 (accessed 21 January 2013).
97. “Ei ACTA-le” (No to ACTA), at http://petitsioon.ee/ei-acta-le (accessed 21 January 2013).
98. “ACTA-vastane protest (Tallinnas, Islandi Väljakul, 11.02.)” (Protest against ACTA in Tallinn), at http://www.facebook.com/events/31402942
5310101 (accessed 21 January 2013).
99. “ACTA-vastane protest (Tartus 11. veebruaril—ülemaailmne protestipäev)” (Protest against ACTA in Tartu), at http://www.facebook.com/
events/293549444038917 (accessed 21 January 2013).
100. T. Kaukvere, “Protestijad: ‘Poliitikud ei tea ise ka, mis see ACTA on!’” (Protesters: “Politicians do not know themselves what ACTA is!”), 2012, 
at http://www.ohtuleht.ee/464341 (accessed 21 January 2012).
101. M.-L. Jakobson et al., 2012. “Populism in the Baltic States,” 2012, is a research project funded by the Open Estonia Foundation and conducted 
by Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance, and partners. See http://www.oef.org.ee/fi leadmin/media/valjaanded/uurin-
gud/Populism_research_report.pdf (accessed 21 January 2013).
102. “Maha Tallinna TV—raha lasteaedadele” (Down with the Tallinn TV—money to kindergartens), see https://www.facebook.com/mahattv?
ref=ts&fref=ts (accessed 21 January 2013).
103. “Õpetajale vääriline palk” (A worthy salary for a teacher), at https://www.facebook.com/pages/%C3%95petajale-v%C3%A4%C3%A4riline-
palk/140245219403684?ref=ts&fref=ts (accessed 21 January 2013).
104. See http://www.minueesti.ee (accessed 10 December 2010).
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of illegally dumped garbage in various parts of Estonia that had been previously located by special Google 
Earth positioning software for mobile phones and mobile phones with GPS.105 Th e “Let’s do it!” campaign 
spread from Estonia to become one of the fastest growing civic movements in history.106 
After the great success of the fi rst year, in February 2009 the volunteers behind the campaign launched a 
virtual “happiness bank” (Onnepank.ee) with “the objective to promote non-monetary values, to help people 
to return to the deeper values.”107 In order to discuss and exchange ideas on how to improve the neighborhood 
and the whole country, a series of brainstorming sessions were organized on 1 May 2009. Th e initiators of 
the undertaking hoped that the brainstorming sessions would yield at least around a thousand small or large 
initiatives, leading to an improved quality of life in Estonia. Social media platforms like Facebook, Orkut, and 
Twitter, but also a project blog and homepage, were used to inform the public, gather ideas, register discussion 
groups, etc. Th e IT opportunities presented on the “My Estonia” website were called the “democracy machine” 
by the organizers, in order to illustrate the idea that they were off ering active people and community leaders 
the chance to continue to engage in the process of solving problems of the greatest importance to the people.108 
All in all, 527 discussion groups (16 of which were only virtual) with 11,800 participants from all over 
Estonia took place.109 An additional 17 brainstorming sessions with more than 200 participants were held in 
12 diff erent countries around the world (among them Finland, Sweden, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, the Czech Republic, Georgia, and the United States).110 Th e initiative received extensive media 
coverage in Estonia, but also abroad (e.g. news stories were published in World News Network, Th e Times, 
BBC, Hindustan Times, China Daily, Corriere della Sera, etc.).111 
Th e subjects discussed most often during the “My Estonia” brainstorming sessions were further addressed in 10 
workshops held all over the country later in 2010. Th e project website provided the users with an opportunity 
to see and express support for the ideas and suggestions expressed during the discussion workshops, which 
were all publicly available in the “idea bank.” Th e website also holds a “deed bank,” which contains projects 
and initiatives initiated by the discussion bees and already brought to life. For example, “Let’s do it: job 
off ers”—an exchange site that helps people fi nd temporary jobs or hire somebody—was jointly realized by 
the leading recruitment website in the Baltics, CV Online, and the “My Estonia” organizing committee. Th e 
aim of the initiative is to reduce unemployment and give people the chance to quickly help one another for 
105. A. Reigas, “Estonians plan virtual ‘happiness bank’ to fi ght recession,” AFP, 28 February 2009, at http://www.minueesti.ee/index.
php?lng=en&leht=87,96 (accessed 10 December 2010) (hereafter, Reigas, “Estonians plan virtual ‘happiness bank’”).
106. A bottom-up global movement uniting 96 countries and growing, at http://www.letsdoitworld.org/news/press-release-bottom-global-movement-
uniting-96-countries-and-growing (accessed 13 January 2013). In 2012, 96 countries and 7 million volunteers around the world participated in 
the global volunteer action World Cleanup 2012, at http://letsdoitworld.org (accessed 21 January 2013).
107. Reigas, “Estonians plan virtual ‘happiness bank’.”
108. See http://www.minueesti.ee/index.php?leht=88,291&modID=291 (accessed 10 December 2010).
109. See http://www.minueesti.ee/?&lng=en (accessed 10 December 2010).
110. “My Estonia brainstorming Session started with 7300 Participants,” press release, 1 May 2009, at http://www.minueesti.ee/?lng=en&leht=87
&mod=arhiiv&artikkel=693 (accessed 20 March 2013).
111. See http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&t=p&source=embed&msa=0&msid109033996416148644888.000464af43340accd
6a35&ll=21.616579,-2.109375&spn=133.12823,360&z=2 (accessed 10 December 2010).
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a short period of time.112 However, it has to be noted that despite the initiative’s success in mobilization, no 
legal action followed the suggestions received through the “idea bank” or brainstorming sessions. 
On 7 January 2013, the People’s Assembly Rahvakogu (Rahvakogu.ee), an online platform for crowd-
sourcing ideas and proposals to amend Estonia’s electoral laws, political party law, and other issues related to 
the future of democracy in Estonia, was launched. Th e aim of the initiative is to strengthen the role of civic 
society in politics between the elections, and to stop the politicization of public offi  ces.113 In the fi rst phase 
of the initiative the general public can make proposals on the subject as well as criticise and comment on the 
proposals of others. In the second phase of the initiative a group of analysts will group the various suggestions 
together and carry out an impact analysis of these scenarios. In the end, the most preferred scenarios will be 
selected in public meetings and later presented to Parliament by the president of Estonia.114 Within a period 
of three weeks, the platform was visited 245,324 times, and 1,238 users have logged in to the site to make a 
proposal or comment on the proposals of others.115 
3.2.2 The Importance of Digital Mobilizations
Th e “My Estonia” project is currently the largest grassroots project (the majority of professionals and specialists 
from the public, private, and third sectors work as volunteers) to make extensive use of digital media technologies. 
However, other platforms have been launched to provide users with an opportunity to create content and 
participate in public policy debate. For instance, due to the need to update online content on a regular basis, the 
established media have started to make more active use of grassroots journalism. Compared with the year 2004 
(when editors-in-chief of Estonian regional papers considered citizens’ participation in the news-making process 
to be insignifi cant),116 a range of established media organizations now encourage the practice.
Furthermore, previous studies have shown that people with traditionally low political involvement seem 
to be considerably more e-active on local issues.117 For instance, although Estonians have been found to be 
relatively uninterested in engaging with traditional media (such as by writing letters to newspapers), they are 
far more active in commenting on news online than their Norwegian counterparts.118 
112. “CV Online and My Estonia launch job exchange site,” 12 October 2009, at http://www.minueesti.ee/index.php?lng=en&leht=87&mod=arhiiv
&artikkel=1135 (accessed 10 December 2010).
113. See http://www.rahvakogu.ee/pages/what-is-rahvakogu (accessed 21 January 2013).
114. See http://www.rahvakogu.ee/pages/what-is-rahvakogu (accessed 21 January 2013).
115. M.Teder, “Rahvakogu külastajate arv kõigub 1500 ja 3000 vahel” (Th e amount of Visitors to People’s Assembly between 1,500 and 3,000), 
Postimees Online, 21 January 2013, at http://www.postimees.ee/1110312/rahvakogu-kulastajate-arv-koigub-1500-ja-3000-vahel (accessed 21 
January 2013).
116. S. Laev, “Osalusajakirjandus ja Eesti maakonnalehtede toimetajate hinnang selle praktikate kohta” (Estonian Regional Paper Editors’ Opinions 
about Civic Journalism and its Practices), thesis for Bachelor’s degree in journalism, manuscript, Tartu, 2004.
117. K. Reinsalu and M. Winsvold, “Does civic culture infl uence the use of online forums? A comparative study of local online participation in 
Estonia and Norway,” Journal of Public Administration and Public Policy 1(1) (2008), pp. 51–67 (hereafter, Reinsalu and Winsvold, “Does civic 
culture infl uence the use of online forums?”).
118. K. Reinsalu, “Kohalike omavalitsuste online-foorumite kasutamisest Eestis ja Norras” (Local Governments’ Use of Online Forums in Estonia 
and Norway), Riigikogu Toimetised 16 (2007), pp. 88–95; Reinsalu and Winsvold, “Does civic culture infl uence the use of online forums?”
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At the same time, the analysis suggests that the success of digital mobilizations does not solely depend on 
the fact that there are increasing opportunities to voice one’s opinion on the online platforms of various 
mainstream media organizations. Although the number of platforms which provide e-participation options 
as well as various civic engagement initiatives has grown over the years, researchers have indicated that UGC 
opportunities “do not require particular resources but depend mainly on user agency: motivation, creativity 
and setting one’s priorities.”119 In other words, potential civic engagement does not merely depend on the 
availability of various technological devices and platforms, but rather people’s motivation, willingness, and 
interest in contributing their thoughts, suggestions, and concerns are crucial in developing civic culture and 
society.
3.3 Assessments
Estonia presents an interesting research example as it began to develop a civic culture in parallel with the 
emergence of virtual communications, and the two are therefore linked to a greater extent than in more 
mature democracies. Th us, it has been suggested that e-participation is probably more integrated with the 
notions of democracy and citizenship in the minds of Estonians, where the connection between online and 
offl  ine political action is weaker compared with other societies, e.g. Norway, where e-participation platforms 
are viewed as just another alternative for engaging in civic activities.120 
Although various civic initiatives and the internet are becoming increasingly integrated in Estonia, there 
is a need to distinguish between manifestations of spontaneous democracy and institutional participatory 
democracy.121 In fact, the number of people actively involved and willing to engage in the public online 
debates and participate in developing civic society is still relatively low. Th erefore, the analysis of UGC in 
Estonia suggests that “the existence of space does not in itself aff ect democratic practices,”122 as changes in 
the values, norms, and thinking patterns of the nation are needed in order for the engagement to be more 
widespread.
119. P. Runnel, Transformation of the internet usage practices in Estonia. Dissertation for the commencement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in 
Media and Communication), Tartu University Press, 2009, p. 64.
120. Reinsalu and Winsvold, “Does civic culture infl uence the use of online forums?”
121. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt et al., “Quality of Life and Civic Involvement.”
122. K. Reinsalu, Th e Implementation of Internet Democracy in Estonian Local governments. Dissertation for the commencement of the degree of Doc-
tor of Philosophy (in Media and Communication), Tartu University Press, Tartu, 2009, p. 48.
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4. Digital Media and Journalism
4.1 Impact on Journalists and Newsrooms
4.1.1 Journalists
Along with digitization, recent developments in journalists’ work have been infl uenced by the economic 
recession. Although at the time of writing this report the crisis should be recovering from its lowest point, the 
economic consequences continue to aff ect the work of editorial boards through budget cutbacks, dismissals, 
reduction of output, and cancellation or postponement of costly projects. In short, keeping costs to a 
minimum has become the default feature of many media business models.
Th e problems resulting from the low-cost business model of online media have been pointed out inter alia 
by the Supreme Court of Estonia in the case Vjatšeslav Leedo v. Delfi . Here, the court ruled that media 
organizations should implement measures suffi  cient to avoid moral damage not just in articles but also 
in the comment sections. Th e Supreme Court indicated that the comment sections are part of the media 
organization’s core content-producing business rather than simply a technical, automatic, and passive service, 
which is what Delfi  had argued.123 
Th is ruling broadens the legal responsibilities of media organizations and consequently adds to the professional 
burden and range of required skills for journalists. Employers expect journalists trained in the traditional 
print medium to be able to edit for online publications, and also to edit and set up audio and audiovisual 
pieces as media output increasingly converges.124
Th e changes in the work patterns of Estonian journalists have not been studied within the last fi ve years, but 
several studies plot the changes based on surveys conducted in 1988, 1995, and 2009. Th ey tend to indicate 
that the most signifi cant changes have taken place in the levels of professionalism.125 Th e early 1990s were 
123. Th e Supreme Court Case 3-2-1-43-09 dated 10 June 2009 (Vjatšeslav Leedo v. Delfi ), at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-43-09 
(in Estonian, accessed 20 January 2011).
124. Statement by Priit Hõbemägi, the then editor-in-chief of the infl uential weekly Eesti Ekspress, at the public meeting held by the Academic Society 
of Journalism in Tartu on 21 January 2011.
125. P. Tali, “Eesti ajakirjanike töö iseloomu muutumine, 1988–2009” (Changes in the Character of the Work of Estonian Journalists, 1988–2009), 
thesis for a Master’s degree in journalism, manuscript, Tartu, 2010, at http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/10062/15841/1/Tali_Piret.pdf 
(accessed 20 January 2011) (hereafter, Tali, “Eesti ajakirjanike töö iseloomu muutumine, 1988–2009”).
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characterized by a generational shift: the infl ow of young, often inexperienced journalists to the profession 
as a result of a major restructuring of the industry (departure of older generations of journalists, creation of 
new jobs, etc.). However, this reign of young and inexperienced journalists (so-called “juvenile reporters”) 
was curbed by the emergence of a certain degree of professionalization within the sector. By 2009, however, 
there was again a shortage of senior journalists as digital media provided new opportunities for younger 
and inexperienced reporters to gain a foothold in the industry. One problem is that this new generation of 
journalists had limited capacity to see events through the prism of recent history that they themselves had 
witnessed.126
With regard to the organizational changes, editorial offi  ces in Estonia tend to be editor-centric and heavily 
supervised. Th e journalists’ workloads seem to be high, while their freedom of choice is limited. Th e 2009 
questionnaire by Piret Tali revealed that journalists place less importance on the freedom of professional 
choice than before. Th e experts interviewed in the study also suggested that transition from the controlled 
system to independent journalism had a much stronger impact on Estonian journalists than the subsequent 
technological revolution.
Ms Tali concluded that:
Th e only signifi cant contribution of the technological revolution seems to be online 
journalism, which has become the main tool undermining the culture of professional 
journalism. Th e new job of a web reporter has made it increasingly easy for inexperienced 
journalists to enter the profession and created a new wave of juvenile journalists, which is 
not as numerous as in the 1990s, but still exists. Th e application of web-based approaches to 
newspaper-making has left its mark on the traditional quality requirements and customary 
working practices. …
Th e character of Estonian journalism has undergone considerable changes, which have 
brought about generational diff erences, with representatives of the pre-revolution generation 
moving away from journalism and creating a new wave of young and inexperienced web 
reporters, all of this leading to de-professionalization. Th e relationships in editorial offi  ces 
have become more hierarchical and more individualistic, whereas journalists have become 
less creative.127
Th e dominance of individualistic values in journalists’ self-perception of their role has been confi rmed by 
another study by Maret Einmann.128 When asked about the key purpose of their profession, respondents 
126. U. Loit and H. Harro-Loit, “Media policies and regulatory practices in a selected set of European countries, the EU and the Council of Europe: 
Th e case of Estonia,” ELIAMEP, Athens, 2010, at http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Estonia.pdf (accessed 20 
January 2011) (hereafter, Loit and Harro-Loit, “Media policies and regulatory practices”).
127. Tali, “Eesti ajakirjanike töö iseloomu muutumine, 1988–2009.”
128. M. Einmann, “Eesti ajakirjanike rollikäsituse muutumine 1988–2009” (Changing Role Perceptions of Estonian Journalists in 1988–2009), the-
sis for a Master’s degree in journalism, manuscript, Tartu, 2010, at http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/10062/15849/1/Einmann_Maret.
pdf (accessed 20 January 2011).
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in 1988 cited the social role of journalists’ work, while by 1995 creative self-realization was seen as the 
major purpose. When queried about major professional skills in 1995, journalists underlined the importance 
of morals and ethics, while in 2009 technical (interpretation) skills were seen as being most important. 
Journalists increasingly defi ne their societal role in a pragmatic way—as just another way to make a living. 
Th e increasing individualism of journalists and identifi cation with their employing company rather than with 
the profession in general are refl ected in declining trade union participation. 
Figure 5.
Participation in the Journalists’ Union (%), 1988, 1995, and 2009
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Source: Tali, “Eesti ajakirjanike töö iseloomu muutumine, 1988–2009”
Th e study by Maret Einmann revealed several role confl icts; in particular, the journalists’ professional values 
and the interests of the organization were often found to be in confl ict. Above all, these role confl icts were 
evident in relation to online media; the journalists noted that their work was negatively infl uenced by group 
pressure or a compulsion to work faster, more productively, and to off er more stories that “sell,” while at 
the same time compromising on professional standards. A new type of pressure has been identifi ed as the 
“click value” of news items—the value defi ned by a particular item’s number of visitors, often leading to 
fl awed editorial decisions and generating misleading or distorted headlines. However, Einmann concludes, 
journalists treated the limitations to their autonomy as normal.
Th e output of major television channels demonstrates that changes in this mode of production sphere have 
not yet led to extensive changes in journalists’ work—except for in their use of professional equipment which 
in the past was the job of technicians—as digital television has not yet launched most of the services enabled 
by the digital switch-over (e.g. interactive services, subtitling, providing live translation, etc.).
4.1.2 Ethics
Expanding online news presents a challenge to professional journalism. Th e possibilities of unlimited space 
mean that online journalists have to produce several news items per day, forcing them to rely on more 
readily available sources of information such as PR material, promotional writing, translations of other online 
information services, and so forth. Th e colonization of online news content by PR material is part of a wider 
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social practice, but in the context of expanding online publishing possibilities, it is important to estimate how 
much original, professional journalistic input is provided by media organizations.129
Several media organizations, including television stations, have launched sections of “public” or “citizen” 
journalism, items of which sometimes appear in the mainstream news. In this context, the new defi nition of 
a journalist (or an editor) has yet to be articulated: to what extent should the editor be engaged in the news 
fl ow created by the audience—editing, verifying, and upgrading it. As the Supreme Court case Leedo v. Delfi  
has established (see section 4.1.1), the media organization has to take responsibility for these public postings 
in their digital environment, but further implications of this remain to be seen.
Th e Estonian Journalists’ Code of Ethics,130 adopted in 1997, has so far not been amended to refl ect online 
journalism. In several aspects the code is also applicable to digital output, but in many respects it does 
not deal with online specifi cs. As the code imposes certain responsibilities both on journalists and media 
organizations, it would be reasonable to expect the same allocation of obligations in the case of digital media.
Th e pressure from the Leedo v. Delfi  case helped to fi nalize the implementation of the notice-and-take-down 
policy relating to internet commentary sections. Th is policy relies on readers to report on comments that are 
off -topic, off ensive, or advertising-related, which subsequently have to be removed by the website owner.131 
However, this measure does not always work eff ectively or promptly, especially in cases of large numbers of 
comments.
Members of the Newspaper Association adopted an agreement about the extent of reasonable quoting of 
online news items among themselves. When adopted in 2005, this agreement limited the extent of reasonable 
and justifi ed quotation to fi ve sentences. In 2009, the limit for direct reproduction was cut to one sentence 
in addition to the headline. Th is limitation caused some dispute among media managers. Some (e.g. Igor 
Rõtov, the director general of the business daily Äripäev) argued that the news needed to fl ow freely and the 
corresponding business models should support it. Others (e.g. Erik Roose, the director general of the daily 
Postimees) insist on respecting the copyright of the news item, which should protect the channels producing 
the news themselves from those who only take advantage of others’ work.132  
129. A. Balčytienė and H. Harro-Loit, “Between reality and illusion: Re-examining the diversity of media and online journalism professionalization 
in the Baltic States,” Journal of Baltic Studies 40(4) (2009), p. 517.
130. See, e.g. http://www.asn.org.ee/english/code_of_ethics.html (accessed 20 January 2011).
131. Th is principle has also been adopted by the council of the Estonian Newspaper Association (30 October 2008).
132. Cited in “Rõtov: Delfi  näitas Postimehe nõrkust” (Rõtov: Delfi  Revealed Weakness of Postimees), a news item by Äripäev, 29 June 2009, based 
on the talkshow “Pressiklubi” on Radio Kuku.
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4.2 Investigative Journalism
4.2.1 Opportunities
As investigative journalism represents a substantial element of the overall quality of journalism, its occurrence 
indicates the general health of the news media. However, despite foreign investment since the late 1990s, 
there has been, as Peter Gross has put it, no sign to confi rm “that the Eastern European media outlets that 
came under Western European ownership have in any way measurably improved their journalism.”133
Th e restrictions set by economic circumstances tend to discourage the development of investigative journalism. 
Exposés are often the result of political leaks (often deliberate), rather than the result of enterprising journalism. 
Few journalists, mainly in weeklies, have the resources (including time and fi nances) to deal in depth with 
certain topics and dig out issues that have not yet been leaked to the press. Here, the speed and volume of the 
news fl ow in the new digitized media serve more as an obstacle for investigative journalism than an advantage.134
However, the means and tools created by digitization have also improved the work of journalists. Th e public 
electronic databases enforced by law (e.g. the commercial register, the register of real estate, etc.) and the public 
document registers of all state municipal and public institutions have greatly facilitated journalistic investigation 
and data verifi cation processes, as these can be done around the clock and with minimum restrictions. If some 
of the information is provided for a fee (e.g. in the commercial register), payment is enabled via e-banking. 
Th e commercial register provides public data about legal entities—for example, the names of board members, 
the bylaws, annual reports (also submitted electronically). Some journalists regularly screen the electronic 
register of the correspondence of ministries and other state bodies to gather information and fi nd angles and 
leads for coverage. 
Internet searches also prove eff ective for background research, but they can also be treacherous as many 
online data require additional verifi cation, as the information may be out-of-date, deliberately false, or in 
other ways confusing. 
4.2.2 Threats
Th reats to investigative journalism derive more from the small size of the media market in Estonia and related 
economic issues than from any political interference. Th e government in Estonia often tends to withdraw 
even in cases where state involvement is needed (as in cases of noncompliance with the provisions of the law, 
broadcasting license conditions, or good practice).135 
133. P. Gross, “Between Reality and Dream: Eastern European media transition, transformation, consolidation, and integration,” East European 
Politics and Societies 18(1) (2004), p. 125.
134. See U. Loit, E. Lauk, and H. Harro-Loit, “Estonia: Fragmented accountability,” in T. Eberwein et al. (eds) Mapping Media Accountability—in 
Europe and Beyond, Herbert von Halem Verlag, Köln, 2011.
135. Results of research by the Institute of Journalism and Communication at the University of Tartu under the Framework Seventh project, Media-
dem, in 2010. See U. Loit and H. Harro-Loit, “Media policy in Estonia: Small market paradoxes,” in E. Psychogiopoulou (ed.), Understanding 
Media Policies. A European Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, pp. 87–88.
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Th us, limited fi nancial resources ultimately account for the deterioration of investigative journalism in 
Estonia.136 Media organizations cannot aff ord to have journalists working on particular issues for weeks, 
given the increasing pressures of daily output production in a saturated and converged media market.
Th e WikiLeaks cases have produced professional debate about the widespread availability of often classifi ed 
documents to the public via the internet. Jane Singer137 argues that inundation with documents can lead 
to an overabundance of information, which causes journalists to become confused and lose control of the 
story, as it tends to obscure the relevance of the leaked items to the public. In Estonia, the leaks have so far 
resulted in a series of short news items of inconsequential facts rather than generated pieces of investigative 
journalism. Th ese leaks may also prove to be manipulative, as the sources are less transparent compared with 
personal communication. Th e leaks producing subsequent journalistic investigation can also be the result of 
a manipulative agenda aiming at dissembling other issues or rearranging the focus of investigations.138
Th e media organizations also drew attention to the recently adopted law amending several earlier laws to 
legally introduce protection of sources and punitive damages in cases of defamation. Th e criticism of the draft 
law was heavy, as it envisaged the possibility of requiring journalists to reveal their sources in certain cases, 
including leaks.139 Th is item was in the end excluded from the law during a parliamentary debate to which 
media organizations were also invited. Th e punitive damages were also heavily criticized due to their potential 
impact on media organizations’ economic performance. 
Opponents remarked that so far the media had hardly ever been held fi nancially responsible for defamation, 
and the draft legislation according to which the complainant does not need to provide evidence of moral 
damage would benefi t society. Analysts argued that possible fi nancial damage could be avoided by more 
rigorous fact checking and editorial evaluation prior to publication—and the size of the damage award would 
always be within the judges’ discretion. With regard to editorial evaluation, the freedom of the press has so 
far been well preserved.140
In short, the internet has not resulted in any threats to investigative journalism, except in so far as the 
online services’ business model erodes support for investigative journalism by reducing the available resources 
(staff , time, funds). As the old business models for journalism have collapsed in tandem with the economic 
recession, it is hard to assess the prospective impact of online news media development trends on investigative 
genres.
136. See A. Balčytienė and H. Harro-Loit, “Preserving journalism 2010,” in B. Dobek-Ostrowska, M. Głowacki, K. Jakubowicz, and M. Sükösd 
(eds), Comparative Media Systems. European and Global Perspectives, CEU Press, Budapest, 2010, pp. 193–208.
137. J. Singer, “Th e socially responsible existentialist: A normative emphasis for journalists in new media environment,” Journalism Studies 7(1) 
(2006), pp. 2–18.
138. Interview with Halliki Harro-Loit, Professor of Journalism at the University of Tartu, Tartu, 25 January 2011. 
139. See, e.g. “National newspapers of Estonia use blank pages to protest against draft legislation on the protection of source information,” 18 March 
2010, a news item by the Estonian Newspaper Association, at http://www.eall.ee/uudised/2010/18_03_10_2.html (accessed 20 January 2011).
140. See, e.g. “Meediaõppejõud: pole põhjust karta, et kohus hakkab sõnavabadust piirama” (Media Educator: No Need to Fear that Court will 
Restrain Freedom of Speech), 27 November 2010, a news item by Delfi .ee, at http://www.delfi .ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/meediaoppejoud-
pole-pohjust-karta-et-kohus-hakkab-sonavabadust-piirama.d?id=35647427 (accessed 20 January 2011).
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4.2.3 New Platforms
Th e amount of investigative journalism done through blogs is insignifi cant. Some blogs with an analytical 
approach toward key public issues cover media too. However, entries tend to be few (up to 10 monthly) 
and limited in scope, often by the same author. Many blogs appear, only to fade away after a relatively 
short period.
Research of user behavior is in its infancy, so comprehensive statistics on the infl uence of social media are 
scarce. Th e estimated number of active blogs was (as of spring 2010) about 6,500.141 Th is is less than one year 
earlier (8,000). Th e number of entries per week reached 7,300 (a year earlier the number was 10,000). Th e 
peak of blogging in Estonia was the spring of 2009. An average blogger in Estonia is a 20-year-old woman. 
Th e proportion of men and women among bloggers is 28:72.
In 2010, the infl uential media owner Hans H. Luik granted his newly established award for “excellence in 
journalism”142 for the amount of € 6,400 (US$ 8,294) to Daniel Vaarik, the creator of the blog Memokraat, 
which often publishes pieces from other authors too. Mr Luik praised the blog for its good-quality journalism, 
especially its innovative format.143 However, most of the entries in this blog, as in several other serious blogs 
(e.g. Isekiri.blogspot.com), tend to be well substantiated and well written opinions rather than investigative 
reporting.
4.2.4 Dissemination and Impact
Digitization by itself has not yet created new practices for the dissemination of investigative journalism, nor 
has it had any noticeable impact on it. Th e journalists interviewed for this report noted ambivalent attitudes 
toward new opportunities.144 For them, digitization tends to shorten the impact period of investigative reports. 
As Mihkel Kärmas defi ned it, the scandal launched by digitally disseminated journalistic investigation “may 
shine more brightly but it lasts shorter than in traditional media.” Digital (online) formats tend not to 
accommodate the profundity necessary for investigative reporting and may even prove to be unprofi table if 
disseminated for free. However, digital publications remain traceable and might provide interactive means 
for data presentation. 
141. Data in this passage about the blogosphere by T. Toots (CEO, Freqmedia OÜ), “Sotsiaalmeedia statistikast” (About Statistics of Social Media), 
at http://www.slideshare.net (accessed 23 October 2010).
142. “Oivaline ajakirjandus” (in Estonian).
143. See “Oivalise ajakirjanduse preemia sai Daniel Vaarik” (Award for Excellent Journalism goes to Daniel Vaarik), a news item by ERR, at http://
uudised.err.ee/index.php?06218026 (accessed 20 January 2011).
144. Email interviews with Tarmo Vahter (30 January 2011) and Mihkel Kärmas (21 January 2011) from Eesti Ekspress; Argo Ideon (1 February 
2011) and Priit Pullerits (31 January 2011) from Postimees.
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4.3 Social and Cultural Diversity
4.3.1 Sensitive Issues
Some of the most sensitive social issues to emerge from the Soviet era concern issues of language and nationality, 
and the consequences of a demographic reshaping of society,145 which started 70 years ago. While this has not 
led to major political crises, confrontations between communities do nonetheless emerge occasionally, due to 
diff erent views of Estonia’s past, present, and future. Th is, as mentioned in several cases in this report, results 
inter alia in diff erent media consumption patterns and consequently diverse information fi elds, which do not 
encourage integration and stability. 
Such was the case of the riot by members of the Russian-speaking community in spring 2007 following the 
relocation of a bronze monument of a Soviet soldier from the city center to a military cemetery (see sections 
2.1.1 and 3.1.3). Th e Soviet period has also left deeply entrenched prejudices toward possible future economic 
immigration from Russia, on which matter the Human Rights Report for 2011 calls for tolerance.146 
Th e courts carry no records of hate speech cases. Intolerance toward various minorities (based on sexual 
orientation, gender, religion, etc.) is, however, a common topic in opinion sections of newspapers. At this 
time of writing, the Ministry of Justice is drafting a law defi ning in more detail the substance of hate speech, 
in line with suggestions from EU institutions. Th e current law prescribes penalties in the event that the 
enmity infl icted also directly threatens someone’s life, health, or property. According to the draft, penalties 
may also be imposed when hostility is incited systematically or in a disturbing manner.147
Such intolerance occasionally also occurs in real life. However, violent collisions do not tend to happen, 
either in society or in the media.
4.3.2 Coverage of Sensitive Issues
Any kind of discrimination and incitement to hatred, violence, or discrimination is prohibited under the 
constitution. No further legal regulation regarding the media has been introduced. In most cases this falls 
under self-regulation practices, such as those introduced by the code of ethics of the Estonian press. 
Incitement to hatred, violence, and discrimination are also prohibited in the comment sections of news 
websites. As a rule, hateful and off ensive comments are expurgated. In certain cases, the online services censor 
comments or closes the thread down.
145. Th e proportion of ethnic Estonians in the total population fell from 88.1 percent (in 1934) to 61.5 percent (in 1989), while the proportion of 
Russians, Ukrainians, and other Russian-speaking ethnicities grew almost fourfold during this period: see census data for 1934 and 1989 from 
Statistics Estonia).
146. K. Käsper and M. Meiorg (eds), Human Rights in Estonia 2011, Annual Report of the Estonian Human Rights Centre, Tallinn, 2012.
147. P. Talv, “Justiitsministeerium soovib muuta vaenu õhutamise kuriteoks” (Ministry of Justice Wants to Make Hate Speech a Crime), Ministry of 
Justice press release, 30 July 2012, at http://www.just.ee/57068 (accessed 20 February 2013).
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Th e number of cases related to unethical coverage of sensitive issues is too small for general conclusions to be 
drawn. Public assault (verbal or physical) against any minorities or weaker parties is usually so shocking in 
Estonia that it gains wide and sometimes sensational media coverage, creating a distorted picture.148
Minorities have only been mentioned in the Estonian National Broadcasting Act where one of the functions 
of the PSB laid down is to “transmit programs which, within the limits of the possibilities of National 
Broadcasting, meet the information needs of all sections of the population, including minorities.”149 On 
public television, this has been implemented by allocating a portion of broadcasting in Russian (including 
a daily newscast). PSB Radio 4 (a Russian-language channel) provides an assortment of programs targetting 
ethnic minorities in their own languages (Belarusian, Ukrainian, Azerbaijani, etc.). Th ere are also several 
Russian-language private radio programs, mainly appreciated for their choice of music by the target language 
group.150
On the print front, several Russian-language weeklies are published in Estonia, though they tend not to have 
online versions. Th e Russian-language national dailies have by and large fallen victim to market competition 
and have closed in recent years (except for the Russian-language version of Postimees and Den za Dnjom (Day 
After Day), a weekly owned by Postimees).
4.3.3 Space for Public Expression
Th e Delfi  news website also has a Russian edition. It tends to be valued primarily for its interactive commenting 
features. Th e comments in Russian sometimes express heated antagonism toward the state and its institutions, 
which is rarely found in comments in Estonian.
No innovative technological solutions have been deployed by the mainstream media for enhancing platforms 
of public expression for minorities. Th e newscasts and other programming targetted at the Russian-speaking 
community on ETV2 provides only linear output, and has not yet been formatted as a digital service with 
optional features (translation either using subtitles or as voice-over).
Th us, digitization has not yet made an impact on media coverage of these issues. However, due to the 
increasing use of social media, the activists of various minorities do now have access to wider audiences.
148. Interview with Halliki Harro-Loit, Professor of Journalism at the University of Tartu, Tartu, 24 February 2013.
149. Estonian National Broadcasting Act, Article 5, section 1, clause 8. 
150. H. Kaldaru, Eesti elanikkonna meediateemaline arvamusuuring 2011 (Survey of Media-related Opinions of the Estonian Population), omnibus 
survey by Turu-uuringute AS for ERR, November 2011, at http://err.ee/fi les/Uuringud_Meediaaruanne_2011.pdf (accessed 10 January 2013).
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4.4 Political Diversity
4.4.1 Elections and Political Coverage
Regulation of media coverage of elections has not changed substantially during the last fi ve years. Despite the 
growth in the number of television channels during the transition to digital, election coverage has not been 
expanded. Most private television broadcasters do not carry political pre-election debates. ETV, now with 
two national channels, has not increased the quantity of pre-election debate.
However, the PSB has launched a pre-election website within its online presence to feature a “voter guide” 
and “monitoring of candidates conduct reports” along with a selection of news items and audio clips. 
Th e recent Media Services Act designed to replace the Broadcasting Act and enacted as of 16 January 2011, 
limits the requirement of political balance only to the period of the active election campaign, except for the 
PSB, where political impartiality is a perpetual obligation. Th e principles of political balance remain the 
same: “upon granting transmission time to a political party or a political movement to present its position, 
a television or radio service provider shall also provide an opportunity to grant transmission time in the 
same program service for other political parties or movements without undue delay.”151 In other words, 
broadcasters must charge all parties the same fees for the aired programs. 
Along with this, the PSB is required to provide rules for refl ecting elections in the program services of 
national broadcasters. Th ese rules are to be approved by the National Broadcasting Council and disclosed up 
to a week after the date elections have been announced.152
Providing an open and pluralistic fl oor in pre-election debates has been standard practice for several election 
seasons. Th e smaller political parties (often not represented in Parliament) and individual candidates have 
protested that their involvement in the television campaigns has been limited. In 2009, the Estonian Greens 
contested the in-house rules for resolving pre-election disputes by the PSB, as they could not participate in the 
debates due to a short candidate list. Th e courts did not uphold the case as they found the claim ungrounded.
4.4.2 Digital Political Communications
Politicians employ new media technologies in their political communications. Th ey have launched blogs, 
Facebook, and Twitter accounts as a means of addressing the general public less formally, sometimes deliberately 
posting comments to attract attention. Media, especially online media, frequently quote these sources. 
Sometimes politicians use social media tools to bypass the gatekeepers of the mainstream media. For instance, 
on the dawn of the general election day in 2011,153 Evelyn Sepp MP, having collected over 4,600 friends on 
151. Media Services Act, Article 14.
152. Estonian National Broadcasting Act, Article 6, section 5.
153. Elections took place on 6 March 2011.
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Facebook,154 suggested that a rival candidate should “set himself on fi re”155 because of his remarks during a 
parliamentary debate.
Social media have defi nitely widened the choice of political sources. At the same time, this information tends 
to be fragmented, dispersed, and irregular. Th is information may easily be distorted while being constructed, 
framed, and mass-circulated by the professional news media.156 Th e interest in political discussions has grown 
slightly, due more to negative trends in the overall political culture (e.g. a government that does not listen 
to any criticism, muddled fi nancing of the political parties, and so forth) than to the internet or digitization 
more generally.
4.5 Assessments
Digitization has intensifi ed the workload of journalists, but it has not signifi cantly infl uenced the quality of 
output. Th e internet has undoubtedly improved the information gathering process, but at the same time it 
has created the burden of greater scrutiny of sources. Th e posting of mass quantities of raw documents, often 
classifi ed, may be staged to mislead journalists and the general public.
Th e output of various online news sites consists of short news items, often based on one longer event or 
speech, or even a talkshow either on television or radio. Th e contexts for such news items are often missing, 
potentially limiting the promotion of understanding and signifi cance of important public interest issues. Th e 
self-regulation of online media is still being shaped—the code of ethics and other principles of good practice 
for the press are being adapted for online application.
Although television broadcasting has technically been switched over to the digital signal, the content of 
terrestrial programs has not been given any digital characteristics such as on-demand capability. Only some 
non-terrestrial (not-on-air) communication networks (Elion’s IPTV service or Starman’s digital cable service) 
have provided a recording option for certain television channels. 
Th e shortcomings of digitally distributed journalism are primarily a result of economic limitations and the 
relatively small size of the market rather than direct political intervention. Digitization has created some 
specialized online sites for election coverage by the mainstream media outlets. But despite an increase in the 
number of digital television channels, there has been no noticeable increase in election coverage and debate. 
Th e same can be said about the coverage of marginalized groups. Although digitization provides additional 
platforms and space for more coverage, the fi nancial and human resources remain the same, or have even 
been cut because of the economic recession.
154. Standing at 22 March 2011. However, she gained only 416 votes in the elections.
155. See “Evelyn Sepp Tõnis Kõivule: pane ennast põlema” (Evelyn Sepp to Tõnis Kõiv: Set Yourself on Fire), Postimees Online news item, 13 January 
2011, at http://www.postimees.ee/?id=371557 (accessed 20 January 2011).
156. Interview with Halliki Harro-Loit, Professor of Journalism at the University of Tartu, Tartu, 25 February 2013.
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5. Digital Media and Technology
5.1 Broadcasting Spectrum157
5.1.1 Spectrum Allocation Policy
Th e spectrum allocation policies in Estonia are in line with EU regulations. Spectrum falls under the domain 
of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Communications. Th e direct regulatory body for spectrum-related 
issues is the Technical Surveillance Authority (Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet, TJA), particularly its Electronic 
Communication Division. Th e general principles for spectrum allocation have been laid down in the 
Electronic Communications Act (adopted in 2004). Th e law envisages the radio frequency allocation plan 
to “determine the manner, regime and purpose of using radio frequencies,”158 as laid down by the minister. 
According to offi  cials interviewed for this report,159 a key objective underpinning this plan is the effi  cient 
and purposeful use of radio frequencies. In other words, unused spectrum must be minimized. Th is 
principle applies also to spectrum licensees, who may for competitive reasons engage in spectrum hoarding. 
For instance, frequencies have been revoked from Elion after it failed to launch a multiplex for which the 
spectrum was allocated (see section 5.1.3). Th is kind of sanction is enshrined in legislation rather than being 
merely a prerogative of the regulator.
Th e Radio Frequency Allocation Plan has adopted the principle of technological neutrality since 2005, and 
the principle of service neutrality as of 25 May 2011. Th is means that in accordance with the plan, frequencies 
have been distributed based on neutral functions and purposes, not specifying any particular technology or 
service type. Th e digital dividend has produced frequencies both for broadcasting (lower spectral band) and 
broadband electronic communication services (higher spectral band). 
157. By broadcasting spectrum, we refer to the radio frequencies or waves in the electromagnetic spectrum which carry radio (including mobile 
phone), television, and radar signals. 
158. Including the radio frequencies used in Estonia for rescue, safety, and national defense purposes; Electronic Communications Act, Article 9, 
section 1.
159. Interviews with Tõnu Nirk, head of the Communications Department of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Communications, and Priit 
Soom, the head of the Electronic Communication Division of the Technical Surveillance Authority (Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet, TJA), Tallinn, 5 
April 2011.
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Th ere are no political preferences regarding the spectrum allocation policy, according to interview respondents. 
Currently, the development of mobile communications is regarded as the most promising trend among all 
options as regards frequency uses that will yield the greatest content value in monetary terms. State aid is 
not provided to the telecommunications sector and spectrum users pay fees for licenses to be granted and 
renewed. Th e fees depend on the type of the license and have been imposed by the State Fees Act. 
5.1.2 Transparency
Th e Electronic Communications Act requires the radio frequencies to be “managed on the basis of objective, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.”160 A defi nitive type of tender for spectrum 
allocations has not, however, been established. Th e terms for every individual issuance of frequency licenses 
are to be determined by the Minister of Economic Aff airs and Communications on a case-by-case basis.161 
A one-off  fee may be established for the license issuance (up to € 1,597,000 (approx. US$2 million)). Th e 
deposit required has to be equal for all participants and must not exceed the one-off  license fee.162 Th e type 
of tender depends mostly on levels of demand for the frequency in question. Auctions have not yet been 
employed by the regulator, refl ecting a political decision to encourage investment in new communications 
infrastructure rather than licenses.163 Th e TJA is the body that conducts the tenders.
Regarding digital terrestrial broadcasting, the fi rst three multiplexes were awarded to the broadcasting 
transmission company Levira under a provision in the Electronic Communications Act.164 Th is was a 
political act to launch the new technology and the company was also obliged to develop the infrastructure 
to technically facilitate the digital switch-over. However, at that stage there was only muted demand from 
commercial players for multiplex licenses.165 Th e Estonian Competition Authority proclaimed Levira to be a 
venture exercising a dominant infl uence on the broadcasting transmission market, and ordered the company 
to provide greater accessibility for other market participants (e.g. regarding transmission facilities higher than 
100 m), non-discriminating service conditions, transparency, and control over prices and costing (a natural 
monopoly).166
Th ere is no evidence to controvert the argument that broadcasting spectrum is in general awarded in a transparent 
and non-biased way (with the exception of a few single isolated cases, where the proceedings may have given 
grounds to question them, but without setting a precedent of non-transparent spectrum allocation).
160. Electronic Communications Act, Article 8, section 2.
161. Electronic Communications Act, Article 9, section 4. 
162. Electronic Communications Act, Article 9, sections 2(2) and 2(4). 
163. Interviews with Tõnu Nirk, head of the Communications Department of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Communications; and Priit 
Soom, the head of the Electronic Communication Division of the TJA, Tallinn, 5 April 2011.
164. Article 190, section 6.
165. Interviews with Tõnu Nirk, head of the Communications Department of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Communications; and Priit 
Soom, the head of the Electronic Communication Division of the TJA, Tallinn, 5 April 2011.
166. Eff ective as of August 2011. Resolution ref. 05.04.11 No. 8-3-12/11-001, at http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/Aprill_2011_T18_otsus.
pdf (in Estonian, accessed 19 April 2011). 
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5.1.3 Competition for Spectrum
A healthy level of competition is secured by law, and is based on technological neutrality and service neutrality. 
According to the Radio Frequency Allocation Plan, the frequencies have been distributed based on neutral 
functions and purposes, not specifying any particular technology or service type. State-run competition 
management ensures that all service providers have equal access to basic services provided by natural 
monopolies (such as Levira’s broadcasting transmission services).
As mentioned in section 5.1.1, the license for digital broadcasting frequencies (channel 37) was revoked from 
the telecoms company Elion after it failed to launch a multiplex for which spectrum had been allocated. Th e 
channel was issued in early 2009 and a year later, during an inspection, non-employment of the frequencies 
was established by the TJA. Under the Electronic Communications Act (Article 18, section 3, subsection 
1), the license was revoked, as “radio spectrum is a limited resource and there is high public interest in their 
availability.”167 Th e above-mentioned clause allows a license to be revoked if the frequencies have not been 
used for six months.
Both broadcasting and new broadband communication services have benefi tted from the digital dividend. 
Much depends on the prevailing trends in the telecoms sector (especially in the EU) and the regulator’s stand 
with regard to these. Various details, of course, can always be questioned—for instance, whether it might 
always be in the public interest to have some spectrum resources set aside for future purposes—but these 
do not detract from the bigger picture, which is one of general adherence to the public interest in spectrum 
allocation.
5.2 Digital Gatekeeping
5.2.1 Technical Standards
Th e technical standard for digital broadcasting (DVB-T using MPEG-4 compression) was determined by 
Levira, the company that was awarded the fi rst three multiplexes to launch digital broadcasting. Some 49 
percent of Levira’s stocks belong to the state and 51 percent to the French company TDF. State authorities 
(due to the technological neutrality principle) have not legally determined the standards and, theoretically, 
any further multiplex operator could choose its own standard.168
However, this would be impractical as, for one reason, viewers have been equipped with MPEG-4 devices. Levira 
made this technological decision based on a larger consensus of market partners: the PSB, other broadcasters, 
etc. Th e state authorities were also consulted regarding their capacity to maintain a wide-based solution.169 
167. Case description based on email interview with Alo Einla, head of the Radio Frequency Management Department of the TJA, 30 January 2013.
168. Interview with Tõnu Nirk, head of the Communications Department of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Communications, Tallinn, 
5 April 2011.
169. Email interview with Indrek Lepp, Director of the Division of Multimedia Services, 18 April 2011.
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As communicated to the general public, MPEG-4 was chosen over MPEG-2 due to its relatively large 
technical capacity and future adjustability: enabling twice as many channels, possessing higher effi  ciency, 
including capability for the soon anticipated utilization of High Defi nition television and Dolby stereo 
sound.170 Estonia was among the fi rst countries to launch the MPEG-4 standard. According to Jüri Pihel, 
who heads the Government Commission on Transition to Digital Terrestrial Television, other countries 
can now reap the benefi ts of Estonia’s groundwork.171 Indrek Lepp from Levira pointed out that choosing 
MPEG-4 enabled the launch of ZoomTV, a terrestrial conditional access network, which would not have 
been possible using MPEG-2.172
5.2.2 Gatekeepers
Access-related problems posed by gatekeepers have not occurred in Estonia, according to the regulator and 
to the best of our knowledge.173 
5.2.3 Transmission Networks
As mentioned in section 5.1.2, Levira exercises a dominant infl uence over the television broadcasting market 
in view of its natural monopoly as the transmission network operator. As a result, the company’s operations 
are under greater scrutiny by the regulators. In September 2011, after two years of investigation, the Estonian 
Competition Authority established that Levira had earned unreasonably high profi ts in the fi scal years 
2007/2008–2009/2010 due to off ering parallel services both for analog and digital broadcasting. However, 
the authority established that since digital switch-over, the company’s profi ts had normalized and thus the 
investigation was concluded without further charges.174 
At an earlier stage in this case, the Competition Authority obliged Levira to disclose on its website the 
technical conditions for its access services, quality levels, ordering procedures, due deadlines for producing 
services, and the price components constituting the total price. Th e Authority prohibited Levira from 
including infrastructure construction costs in the admission fee, in case the constructed facility remains in 
Levira’s possession and produces a profi t in future operations. In December 2011, all the major television 
broadcasters (ERR, Kanal 2, and TV 3) initiated legal proceedings against Levira in a bid to reclaim the 
overpayments of service fees (around € 600,000 (US$ 777,734) each). At this time of writing, the court 
proceedings are still at the stage of preliminary hearings.
When it comes to the involvement and infl uence of transmission networks in spectrum allocation, no such 
cases have occurred.
170. From the FAQ at the offi  cial site of transition to digital broadcasting, at http://www.digilevi.ee/?mis=kkk (accessed 17 April 2011).
171. Quoted in “Digitelevisioon toob lisakanaleid ja investeeringuid” (Digital Television will Add Channels and Investment), Forte.ee, 17 October 
2010, at http://forte.delfi .ee/archive/print.php?id=33211487 (accessed 17 April 2011).
172. Email interview with Indrek Lepp, Director of the Division of Multimedia Services, 29 January 2013.
173. Interviews with Tõnu Nirk, head of the Communications Department of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Communications; and Priit 
Soom, head of the Electronic Communication Division of the TJA, Tallinn, 5 April 2011.
174. Ruling by the Estonian Competition Authority on concluding the administrative proceedings invoked upon applications by the Association of 
Estonian Broadcasters of 7 July 2009, and Eesti Digitaaltelevisiooni AS of 19 March 2010, on 16 September 2011, Ref. No. 5.1-5/11-020, at 
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/Otsused/2011/o2011_20.pdf (accessed 30 January 2013).
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5.3 Telecommunications
5.3.1 Telecoms and News
Th ere is one broadcasting transmission company operating in the digital terrestrial market (Levira) which 
itself does not produce media content. Th is was pointed out by KPMG’s 2010 report on the digital switch-
over in Central and Eastern Europe, noting that Levira functions as a content-neutral distributor causing no 
pressure on broadcasters’ content.175 Th e major cable networks Starman and STV also do not produce media 
content, and nor does the IPTV provider Elion. Th eir earlier attempts have not proved to be eff ective (often 
broadcasting text-TV or fl ames in a fi replace during periods of dead airtime). Th is has helped to shore up 
competition in the broadcasting sector and to preserve the principle of net neutrality in the online sphere.
Th e Estonian Association of Information Technology and Telecommunications, conjoining the major cable 
operators, has been lobbying for a reintroduction of the “must carry” principle with regards to free-to-air 
television programs—to guarantee, for instance, that pay-TV packages include the PSB channels. For these 
purposes, the association has made legal representations directly to the parliamentary commissions, bypassing 
the Ministry of Culture, which is accountable for issues related to media content and copyright. Th e television 
broadcasters themselves have, however, resisted the motion due to copyright reasons, in order to preserve the 
right to either allow or forbid the transmission by a particular pay-distributor and to collect royalties for 
program transmission.
5.3.2 Pressure of Telecoms on News Providers
Th ere have been no cases where cable and telecoms operators have exerted pressure on news providers.
5.4 Assessments
In Estonia, spectrum allocation is in line with EU rules. Th e law explicitly requires the radio frequencies to 
be “managed on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.” No cases 
of political interference in spectrum allocation have emerged.
Th e spectrum regulation of Estonia has proved to be appropriate for the country. Th ere is a healthy level of 
competition that is secured by laws, and it is based on technological and service neutrality.
Although the Electronic Communications Act does not mention the “public interest” verbatim, the purpose 
of the law defi ned in Article 1 is to “create the necessary conditions for the development of electronic 
communication to promote the development of electronic communications networks and communications 
services without giving preference to specifi c technologies and to ensure the protection of the interests of 
175. Cited in “Digitelevisioon toob lisakanaleid ja investeeringuid” (Digital TV will Add Channels and Investment), Forte.ee, 17 October 2010, at 
http://forte.delfi .ee/archive/print.php?id=33211487 (accessed 17 April 2011).
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users of electronic communications services by promoting free competition and the purposeful and just 
planning, allocation and use of radio frequencies and numbering”—this reference to “users” can be defi nable 
as “the public.”
Th ere is nothing to controvert the argument that the legal framework is in line with the EU requirements and 
aimed at the general good of the public. Also, the regulator in this fi eld is following generally good principles 
of administration and no major discrepancies have been revealed which would indicate misrule in the sector.
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6. Digital Business
6.1 Ownership
6.1.1 Legal Developments in Media Ownership
Media ownership in Estonia has generally not had sector-specifi c regulation, and this has not changed over 
the last fi ve years. General rules for concentration and other related matters apply equally to all industries, 
including the media. Th e only provision addressing media ownership directly has been embedded in the 
Broadcasting Act, which was replaced by the Media Services Act, enforced in January 2011.
Th e regulation imposed an option for the licensing authority (Ministry of Culture) to refuse to issue a 
broadcasting license in case “a person operating as a television and radio broadcaster or the responsible 
publisher of a daily or a weekly newspaper would become simultaneously a person operating as a television 
and radio broadcaster and the responsible publisher of a daily or a weekly newspaper in the territory planned 
for the broadcasting activity or a part of the territory of Estonia.”176 
Crucially, however, the Broadcasting Act provided only the grounds for refusing to issue a broadcasting 
license, not for revoking a license. As reported in 2005, monopoly or cartel conditions are not listed as one of 
the reasons for which a license may be revoked, nor is there any general statement prohibiting concentration 
in the market.177 Partly as a consequence of this, signifi cant concentration and cross-media ownership has 
been allowed to persist since the law was introduced in 1994. One case in particular involves the ownership 
by the Norwegian company Schibsted of 50–100 percent of several newspapers (including the leading daily 
Postimees and several local papers), 100 percent of a national television station (Kanal 2), and 32 percent of 
one of the two largest radio businesses (Trio LSL).178 
Another probable cause for the lack of implementation of the cross-ownership rule is its reliance on the 
voluntary declarations of ownership by the media businesses themselves. Furthermore, the possessions of 
Schibsted have been registered under diff erent legal entities: Kanal 2 is registered as a property of Schibsted, 
176. Broadcasting Act, Article 40, section 4, subsection 8.
177. Loit, Television across Europe. Budapest: OSI, 2005. 
178. See Loit and Harro-Loit, “Media policies and regulatory practices.”
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while Postimees is registered as the property of Eesti Meedia. Th is has allowed the argument that Schibsted’s 
holdings do not exhibit concentration according to the law. 
Th e recent law has not made the regulation any clearer: it stipulates that the broadcasting license (henceforth 
“activity license”) may not be granted in cases where the applicant is “by means of the governing eff ect 
over management connected to the undertaking that has been granted the activity license for provision of 
television and radio service and this may substantially damage the competition in the media services market, 
particularly through creation or reinforcement of the dominant position in the market.”179 Moreover, the 
provision can still only be enforced in the case of new license applications, and does not provide any grounds 
for cancellation or non-renewal of existing licenses.
6.1.2 New Entrants in the News Market
Th ere have been no enduring new entrants in the Estonian news market in the last fi ve years. Attempts by 
outside interests to capitalize on the convergence and proliferation of the Estonian media market have to date 
ended only in spectacular failure.
In 2008 Kalev Meedia, an affi  liate of holdings that include the widely known chocolate factory Kalev and 
milk-manufacturing company Tere, started its operations in the Estonian media market. Several magazines 
were purchased, a digital free-to-air Kalev Meedia television channel was launched, another cable channel 
(Neljas) was purchased, as well as radio station Sun FM (in Tartu and Pärnu), and an internet news site was 
also added to the service portfolio. Th roughout the year the activities were under the scrutiny of competitors: 
Kalev Meedia did not start advertising sales or otherwise increase its income, whilst running up exorbitant 
costs.180 According to some estimates, the owner of the stock company Oliver Kruuda lost € 220,000 (US$ 
285,152) per month in the magazine business, and in total between around €1 million and €1.4 million 
(US$1.3 million–1.8 million) per quarter.181 By the fi rst half of 2009 all the media businesses of Kalev 
Meedia were halted, the company itself was bankrupted, and some 200 employees were dismissed.
6.1.3 Ownership Consolidation
Small markets like Estonia tend not to possess enough resources in terms of the information society to ensure 
a versatile and thereby superb fl ow of information. Th e small size of the market does not favor competition 
by several media companies, as it causes fragmentation of resources. As Gillian Doyle has put it, “It is possible 
that a more monopolistic industry structure would yield a greater diversity of media output (content) than 
would be economically feasible in a more fragmented and competitive industry structure.”182
179. Media Services Act, Article 32, clause 3.
180. See “Peeter Raidla: Kalev Meedia oli kui rahapõletusahi” (Peeter Raidla: Kalev Meedia was like a Cash Cremator), Õhtuleht, 16 January 2009.
181. See “Peeter Raidla: Kalev Meedia oli kui rahapõletusahi” (Peeter Raidla: Kalev Meedia was like a Cash Cremator), Õhtuleht, 16 January 2009; 
U. Jaagant, “Kruuda maksis iga kuu ajakirjadele peale 3,5 miljonit” (Kruuda Paid Extra EEK 3.5 million (€0.2 million) to the Magazines), Eesti 
Päevaleht, 14 January 2009. 
182. G. Doyle, Media Ownership, Sage, London, 2002, p. 17.
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While the small scale of the Estonian media sector favors oligopolistic market conditions, media convergence 
and developing cross-media ownership aff ect the journalists’ job market and thus the level of professional 
journalism and professional ethics in news production and content. Th e supremacy of one or two large media 
concerns might be counterbalanced by eff ective policy measures that address the public need for balanced 
and credible information. Existing examples are the news quota obligation imposed on broadcasters, and 
the Media Services Act, which provides a statutory underpinning for self-regulation of the press (in certain 
areas such as adverts for food and children’s goods). Content regulation, however, may impact negatively on 
freedom of expression.183
Another paradox of the small market concerns a tension between two basic functions of the media in a 
democratic society: pluralism and integration.184 Th us, the expansion of channels that might lead to increased 
choice—but might also decrease the function of the media in promoting a common culture and national 
identity—is not a signifi cant factor in Estonia, given that the scale of the media market itself limits the 
proliferation of outlets. However, commercialization and the necessity for cheaper production might make 
this advantage dysfunctional. Oligopoly can easily turn into monopoly: the balance is vulnerable and fragile.
With respect to the aspects discussed above, no major consolidations of the media market have emerged over 
recent years. Nevertheless, some changes have occurred, slightly before releasing the current report. 
First, newsrooms of the second-biggest daily Eesti Päevaleht and the Delfi  online service were merged in March 
2012, while the legal bodies remained as separate entities. Th is was due to the fact that Ekspress Group also 
acquired the rest of the shares in the company publishing the daily. At fi rst, it took some eff ort to align the 
diff erent working cultures.185 Th e professor of journalism Halliki Harro-Loit pointed out that to produce a 
qualitative shift as a result of the merger, it would necessitate corresponding investments in professional content 
production and the development of new (interactive) genres. While the quantitative output is large, perhaps too 
large, Professor Harro-Loit has as yet not observed any notable implementation of the investments needed to 
provide the quality shift, whereas the existing media business models have become obsolete.186
Mr Luik (owner of Ekspress Grupp) claimed at a media policy conference in December 2012 that this merger 
had not led to the expected economic constraints. On the other hand, he claimed that the merger had helped 
to spawn synergies between the operations of the two outlets.187 A full evaluation of this step is, however, not 
yet possible.
183. U. Loit and H. Harro-Loit, “Media policy in Estonia: Small market paradoxes,” in E. Psychogiopoulou (ed.), Understanding Media Policies: A 
European Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, pp. 85–99.
184. K. Karppinen, “Making a diff erence to media pluralism: a critique of the pluralistic consensus in European media policy,” in B. Cammaerts and 
N. Carpentier (eds), Reclaiming the Media: Communication Rights and Democratic Media Roles, Intellect Books, Bristol, 2007, p. 15.
185. T. Tammeorg, Koosolekukommunikatsiooni analüüs Eesti Päevalehe näitel võrdluses Irish Timesiga (Analysis of communication at the meetings in 
Eesti Päevaleht compared to those in Th e Irish Times), thesis for Master’s degree in journalism, manuscript, Tartu 2012, at http://dspace.utlib.ee/
dspace/bitstream/handle/10062/27445/tammeorg_teele.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 20 February 2013).
186. Interview with Halliki Harro-Loit, Professor of Journalism at the University of Tartu, Tartu, 25 February 2013.
187. Hans H. Luik, at the conference “Media policy: News journalism and media competency—how can the watchdog be nourished?,” held by the 
Chair of Journalism at the University of Tartu, Tallinn, 7 December 2012.
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Another very recent change in ownership involved radio: at the end of 2012, the Estonian Competition 
Authority approved the purchase of the remaining radio business shares by the Schibsted-owned Eesti 
Meedia—publisher of Postimees daily (see section 6.1.1)—from Communicorp Group Ltd (from Ireland). 
Th is sale was triggered by the vendor’s economic situation; Eesti Meedia’s newsrooms remain separate, no 
public announcements have been made about changing output, and no actual changes have been observed.
With regard to pluralism, the media still play an integrating role in Estonian society. Media pluralism in 
Estonia exists to the extent that there are at least two competing daily mixed-type good-quality newspapers, 
as reported at a discussion of the Estonian Academic Society of Journalism.188 Th ere are besides this two 
large competing commercial television channels, and they are above all balanced by the output of the PSB 
television and radio services.
6.1.4 Telecoms Business and the Media
Th e main players in the telecoms market have remained the same. Th e largest by both subscribers and sales 
is Elion (the former telephone company Eesti Telefon), which off ers “triple-play” services—phone lines, 
broadband internet, and IPTV. Starman started as a cable company and after some mergers 10 years ago 
has also become a provider of triple-play services. Other fi xed-line operators also provide triple-play services 
through interconnection with Elion’s network, and mobile operators (such as Elisa) off er broadband services 
(3.5G and 4G).
Th e fi rst three multiplexes were licensed to Levira, a broadcasting transmission company that was obligated 
to develop the digital terrestrial networks (one multiplex for free-to-air channels and two for pay-TV) 
guaranteeing 100 percent coverage over the entire territory of the country. Th is needed additional developing, 
as the analog television coverage was less than 100 percent. In 2011, on the basis of a tender, Starman was 
also awarded a license for three multiplexes, which they operate from the facilities of Levira (as the natural 
monopoly of television broadcasting antennas).
By 2011, the telecoms companies had withdrawn from content provision (people still vividly recall the 24-hour 
transmissions of waterfalls or fl ames) and focussed instead on distributing the content of others. While the 
reasons for this withdrawal are not clear, it was presumably the result of a rationalization of resources and the 
acceptance that direct competition with content providers was not the optimum business model going forward. 
6.1.5 Transparency of Media Ownership
Data regarding all legal interests in media corporations are publicly available and accessible online via the 
Commercial Register, and no cases have occurred in which unclear or hidden proprietary relations have 
aff ected media performance. However, the registration of interests is not formally audited by the regulatory 
authorities, and there is some evidence to suggest that this has impeded implementation of Estonia’s already 
minimal cross-ownership rules (see section 6.1.1). 
188. On 17 March 2011, in Tartu.
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6.2 Media Funding
6.2.1 Public and Private Funding
From 2005 to 2007, advertising showed rapid growth: all sectors grew at a yearly rate of over 20 percent, and 
online advertising grew from 66 percent to 69 percent year on year.189
Th e fi rst signs of economic recession appeared in the results of 2008, when the total advertising spend was 
slightly down (by 3 percent) compared with 2007. In 2008, the newspaper sector declined by 13 percent, 
magazines by 10 percent, and television by 2 percent. Next year, the drop was more excessive—36 percent—
and advertising in all media sectors decreased: newspapers by 41 percent, magazines by 56 percent, television 
by 31 percent, radio 26 percent, and online by 24 percent. In 2010, some growth in some sectors could be 
observed but in total the trend was still downward, by 7 percent. Th e most developing sector was online with 
6 percent growth, and television and outdoor advertising also showed marginal growth. All other sectors were 
shrinking—newspapers, for instance, by 20 percent.
Th e total advertising expenditure in 2011 remained slightly below the level of 2005 (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6.
Total advertising expenditure (€ million (US$ million)), 2005–2011
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Source: TNS Emor
ERR is not involved in the advertising market, and it receives most of its income from state allocations. 
Th ese allocations have been decreasing since 2008 (by 3.6 percent in 2009 and 7 percent in 2010). In 2011 
and 2012, the state allocations remained below the level of 2008. ERR’s other income is generated by the 
broadcaster itself, in the form of various services.
189. Data in this section sourced from TNS Emor, at http://www.emor.ee (accessed 10 April 2011).
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Table 14.
ERR’s budget (€ million (US$ million)), 2006–2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State allocations 
for daily operations
Radio 7.2 (9.3)
20.6 (26.6) 22.0 (28.4) 25.1 (32.4) 24.2 (31.3) 22.5 (29.1)
TV 13.4 (17.3)
Total budget 
(all income)
Radio 7.5 (9.7)
23.4 (30.2) 29.6 (38.3) 34.0 (44.0) 28.8 (37.2) 28.6 (37.0)
TV 15.9 (20.5)
Source: Minutes from the meeting of the Broadcasting Council, 6 February 2006; ERR Annual Budgets (2007–2010)
Th e other segment of the media sector mainly fi nanced by the state comprises cultural newspapers and 
periodicals, published by the Kultuurileht Foundation, which received €1.37 million (US$ 1.77 million) 
from the state budget in 2012,190 rising to €1.47 million (US$1.9 million) for 2013.
 
As for the commercial press, by 2009 copy sales revenue had surpassed advertising income for newspapers. 
Th is also means that the audience factor has become a more infl uential cause in newspapers’ agenda setting, 
which was not the case in previous years.191
Figure 7.
Breakdown of newspaper revenues by type (%), 2005–2010
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Source: Estonian Newspaper Association, at http://www.eall.ee/ajalehetoostus/index.html (accessed 10 April 2011)
A specifi c feature of shares of advertising expenditure in Estonia is that the major part of it has been held by 
the newspaper sector since the early 1990s. Only at the beginning of 2010 did television surpass newspapers 
in advertising expenditure, which has naturally been the position for television across Europe. Th e dominance 
190. Budgets of the Ministry of Culture, 2012, 2013, at http://www.kul.ee/index.php?path=0x1x56 (accessed 20 February 2013).
191. Comment from the public meeting held by the Estonian Academic Society of Journalism in Tartu, 18 March 2011.
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of the newspaper sector can be explained historically by the relatively high rate of literacy among Estonians 
by the end of the 19th century, and the inclusion of reading in the common educational standards since the 
17th century, also among the peasantry.
However, the shares of the television and newspaper sectors became equal in the fi rst quarter of 2010 (31 
percent each). Th e newspaper sector’s share has shrunk, while the portion of the television sector has not 
increased much. Presumably, a big expenditure share has been ceded to the rapidly expanding online sector, 
which is partly controlled by the same media companies that publish newspapers. Th e linguistic barriers have 
so far kept global search engine companies, Google and others, largely away from Estonia’s tiny market, but 
the impact of global online services on the Estonian advertising market will be seen in the very near future.192 
Spending on online advertising has increased as advertisers moved parts of their marketing budgets to the 
internet. However, online advertising is still low in Estonia. Th ere are no accessible data broken down by 
recipients of online advertising.
Th e radio sector has remained relatively stable and advertising grew slightly during the economic recession, 
most likely due to the relatively cheaper cost of airtime compared with television.
Figure 8.
Advertising expenditure breakdown by sector (%), 2005–2010
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192. Erik Roose, Business Director of Postimees, at the “Media policy: News journalism” conference, Tallinn, 7 December 2012.
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6.2.2 Other Sources of Funding
Th ere are no other signifi cant sources of funding in the media. Online versions of some newspapers have pay-
walls for reading certain stories (mainly published in the paper copy) or archives. A day pass and an article 
pass are on off er by Postimees, Äripäev, Eesti Ekspress, and Maaleht. Th e article pass costs €1.50 (US$1.94) 
(a year ago it was €0.10 (US$0.12)), the day pass €3.00 (US$3.88) (a year ago €0.35 (US$0.45)). One can 
pay via mobile phones. However, this type of revenue sourcing is only in its introductory phase, and it is too 
early to tell whether it will prove to be a sustainable source of income. Th e attempts made earlier to establish 
pay-walls around online news content were not successful as the audience had become accustomed to getting 
news on the internet for free.
Th e state does not subsidize the media in any form (except for budget allocations for the PSB and the 
state foundation issuing cultural outlets).193 However, there is an opportunity to get single-purpose project 
fi nancing to cover certain topical issues (radio or television programs, special pages or inserts in newspapers), 
which may often be the only way to get these topics into the media, even to ERR. Th e state institutions 
sometimes buy advertising to disseminate their public announcements (ERR airs them for free). Th e fi nances 
used for that purpose are quite small and have caused no hassle among the public or the industry. Broadcasters, 
especially radio stations, disseminate state social campaigns through the Association of Broadcasters across 
all member stations.
6.3 Media Business Models
6.3.1 Changes in Media Business Models
Recent changes in media business models have been triggered more by the economic recession than by 
technological revolution. Of course, both factors have been entwined and CEOs interviewed for this report194 
stressed the diffi  culty in distinguishing between them. Th e drop in the advertising market has been the 
primary and surface cause of falling incomes. For instance, by 2010 the television advertising market had 
shrunk by 3 percent, compared with 2005. In the case of newspapers, the recession has catalyzed readers’ 
migration to online news and caused a reduction in subscriptions by approximately 5–10 percent.195 But 
this has been somewhat off set by a corresponding reduction in circulation costs. For smaller papers, the 
subscription income is insignifi cant compared with advertising, so losing it would not be lethal for them.
193. See H. Harro-Loit and U. Loit, “Policy suggestions for free and independent media in Estonia,” in Policy Report Addressing State and Non-state 
Actors Involved in the Design and Implementation of Media Policies Supportive of Media Freedom and Independence, the European Union and 
the Council of Europe, Mediadem/ELIAMEP, Athens, 2012, pp. 43–51, at http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
D4.1.pdf (accessed 10 January 2013).
194. Interviews for this passage with Igor Rõtov, Director General of Äripäev business daily, Tallinn, 19 April 2011; Erik Roose, Business Director 
of Postimees, Tallinn, 25 April 2011; Priit Leito, Director General of TV 3, Tallinn, 9 May 2011; and Priit Jõgi, Manager of the Trio LSL Radio 
Group, Tallinn, 19 April 2011.
195. Interview with Erik Roose, Business Director of Postimees, Tallinn, 25 April 2011.
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Th e number of newspaper readers online is constantly increasing, while advertising income is generated by 
sales of the print editions. Despite the fact that online advertising sales are growing and have been increasing 
even throughout the recession, this has not off set declines in print advertising and circulation. Th e online 
reader produces minimal income (for Äripäev approximately 1 percent of the total income)196 and, as 
mentioned above, the introduction of pay-services has not yet had a signifi cant impact on business models.
Cost expenditure has decreased in tandem with the decline in revenues. Cuts have occurred in all segments of 
media production. However, personnel costs cannot be slashed further, as online news also depends on some 
qualifi ed staff . Where media managers achieve greater savings is in converging online and offl  ine newsrooms. 
Cross-media convergence has not been implemented in many outlets.
Under the circumstances, the previous business models of news media have collapsed, as was recognized at a 
media policy conference held in Tallinn in December 2012.197 Th e participants revealed that online-offl  ine 
convergence with Delfi  and Eesti Päevaleht was not as cost-effi  cient as had been expected,198 and the layer of 
fat that helped bigger media organizations through the economic recession has been devoured. Any further 
economic turbulence may cause unpredictable developments.199
Television revenue models have also been aff ected by market fragmentation and the emergence of niche 
channels. Th is trend is increasingly benefi tting the large television companies, which have introduced smaller 
subsidiaries. 
Digitization has led to a broad array of cost pressures on television broadcasters. With market fragmentation, 
the large channels have needed to provide more domestic content in order to retain viewers, as foreign 
production may easily be accessed on any other channel. According to Olle Mirme, Program Director at Kanal 
2, original production lies is the heart of any channel and helps to bring out its distinctiveness among the 
overall choice of available options.200 Statistics, however, do not confi rm steady growth of original production 
at Kanal 2 and TV 3 since 2010.201 Original production is relatively costly and the price of acquisitions has 
exhibited an upward trend in recent years.
Broadcasting transmission costs in digital are less than they were in analog, but the television broadcasters 
have decided to cut costs here too, as the income from advertising has not grown suffi  ciently to cover them. 
196. Interview with Igor Rõtov, Director General of Äripäev business daily, Tallinn, 19 April 2011.
197. Conference on “Media policy: News journalism,” Tallinn, 7 December 2012. 
198. Hans H. Luik, owner of Ekspress Group, at the “Media policy: News journalism” conference, Tallinn, 7 December 2012.
199. Erik Roose, Business Director of Postimees, at the “Media policy: News journalism” conference, Tallinn, 7 December 2012.
200. Olle Mirme, Program Director at Kanal 2, interviewed in K. Karro, “Olle Mirme: ‘Kanal 2 jalad on hetkel kõige pikemad ja lihaselisemad’” (Olle 
Mirme: “Th e Legs of Kanal 2 are Currently the Longest and most Muscular”), Eesti Ekspress, 11 November 2011.
201. Very generally, there was more “own” production in 2011 than in 2010, but in 2012 the statistics—based on data annually reported by the 
broadcasters to the Ministry of Culture—do exhibit an overall decline in own production volume. Th e reason for this may be sought in the 
shrinking television advertising market in the fi rst half of 2012, over 2011. According to TNS Emor, there was a 5.1 percent decrease in TV 
advertising volume; see http://www.emor.ee/eesti-meediareklaamituru-i-poolaasta-kaive-oli-3663-miljonit-eurot (accessed 30 January 2013).
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Already in 2009 (TV 6) and 2011 (Kanal 11), the new digital channels abandoned free-to-air terrestrial 
transmission, as it only caused extra costs and produced no eff ect in reaching the target audiences. In 2012, 
both Kanal 2 and TV 3 threatened to leave free-to-air terrestrial transmission, claiming that the Electronic 
Communications Act enabled them to collect royalties from the cable networks relaying their content.202 
As indicated in section 1.2.1, the cable networks were not willing to pay the television broadcasters. In 2012, 
the threats became serious. As explained by Urmas Oru, the Director General of Kanal 2, it was preferable 
for television broadcasters to pull out of free-to-air transmission and achieve their goal immediately rather 
than start court proceedings lasting for several years.203 Mr Oru claimed that most channels relayed by cable 
networks are paid by the network operators, while they incur no content production costs in Estonia and are 
not subordinated to Estonian jurisdiction (regarding output requirements), although in many cases they do 
sell advertising on the Estonian market. 
Supported by the Ministry of Culture, the Electronic Communications Act was amended at the end of 2012 
to clarify that the large television broadcasters have the right to collect royalties. Tough negotiations over the 
royalties followed between the cable operators and large commercial channels (Kanal 2 was not shown on the 
STV network and TV 3 on the Starman network for a period of time); by the end of January 2013, the issue 
had been largely settled. 
Radio broadcasters, on the other hand, have been very little infl uenced by digitization beyond technical 
changes in production costs and the provision of additional services (podcasts, online players, audio archives). 
While these do not yield new sources of income, they do add value for the listener.
Radio probably has the poorest future regarding digitization, as there have not even been any discussions 
regarding upgrade or switch-over to a digital signal. Reasons for this include the absence of an agreed 
generic standard and consequent high costs for receivers, and the diffi  culty of convincing consumers of the 
benefi ts when digitization off ers no obvious improvements in sound quality. Any surplus demand for analog 
frequencies can be accommodated by reallocating existing resources more eff ectively, and reappropriating 
other spectrum after neighboring countries have restructured their own broadcasting spectrum.204 
As to future trends, the interviewed CEOs alluded to specifi c uncertainties arising from the relatively small 
scale of the market. Th e unpredictability of audiences, especially concerning their readiness to pay for new 
digital services, makes media organizations increasingly cautious as regards investment in new technologies, 
particularly during the economic recovery.
202. U. Oru, “Minister komaga kimpus” (Minister’s Complication over a Comma), Postimees, 17 May 2012.
203. U. Oru, “Minister komaga kimpus” (Minister’s Complication over a Comma), Postimees, 17 May 2012.
204. Russia, for example, still broadcasts television on VHF along the frontier with Estonia. Th is frequency range contains spectrum also for 100 FM 
radio broadcasting.
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Hans H. Luik asked the rhetorical question: would there be any news in Estonia for which the audience 
would be willing to pay? He argues that while a “media product” could be made available for free in principle, 
professional journalism cannot.205 Th e heads of Äripäev and Postimees fi nd that the audiences probably would 
not start paying for news they have already got for free: ongoing experiments with online pay-walls have 
yet to demonstrate any signifi cant potential for new income sources, as the web with its global resources 
also generates fragmentation. Erik Roose, Director General of Postimees, does see a future in launching 
some distinctive paid-for niche services online. But by and large the online versions will have to subsist 
on advertising income. Online news fl ow might be chargeable only after printed papers are phased out 
of production, according to Roose. Igor Rõtov, the Director General of Äripäev, envisages that by 2015 
the printed issue may be less widely read compared with the online version and it will become an “elite 
item for elderly people.” However, Mr Rõtov predicts that paper versions will disappear only “gradually and 
agonizingly.” 
For the television sector, fragmentation is predicted to continue, with the major broadcasters such as Kanal 
2 and TV 3 launching more niche channels to cater for particular audiences.206 However, these channels will 
not likely have a terrestrial presence, as has been the case with new channels launched by Kanal 11 and TV 
6: target audiences for specialist channels tend to be on cable networks or other pay platforms (conditional 
access: satellite in Viasat, pay-terrestrial in ZoomTV) and the channels do not need to pay for distribution 
in cable or other pay platforms. All new digital terrestrial free-to-air channels, licensed in 2008, have now 
vanished, except for the public channel ETV2: one went bankrupt, while two others were restructured as pay-
TV channels. Media policy has not adequately addressed this market failure of digital terrestrial television, 
which threatens to limit the diversity and plurality benefi ts of digitization for pay-TV viewers. 
6.4 Assessments
Digitization by itself has not aff ected monopolies and dominant positions in the media market. Digitization 
in terrestrial broadcasting has enlarged the spectrum resources available, not all of which have been fi lled by 
additional free-to-air programming via multiplexes reserved for digital terrestrial broadcasting. Th e current 
oligopolistic structure of the media system seems appropriate for Estonia given its relatively small media 
market, although it needs permanent monitoring to avoid being taken advantage of by media corporations 
and to ensure that the public interest trumps any other. Media ownership by politicians is not a problem 
in Estonia, and ownership transparency has been signifi cantly enhanced by the availability of a commercial 
register online for the last fi ve years.
Th ere are no indications that the impact of ownership on the performance and independence of the media 
has changed as a result of digitization.
205. Hans H. Luik interviewed by Hannes Võrno on Kanal 2’s show “Hannes Võrno Q,” 24 April 2011.
206. According to Priit Leito, Director General of TV 3.
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For the best journalistic output and quality, conditions would be required under which the media owners 
and managers, and also the audience, are willing to spend on quality. Public funds would probably guarantee 
stable diversity and pluralism, especially in broadcasting where the funding for publicly relevant news is 
clearly inadequate. Public funds do not necessarily produce public institutions. For instance, local radio 
stations and newspapers can fulfi ll some public functions at a local level, which cannot be done by national 
channels. Th is in its turn would necessitate a corresponding state policy. Currently, the advertising fl ow seems 
to be the priority and it often blurs the boundary between advertising and journalistic content. In a small 
market, it is often impossible to fi nd private sponsors for content of high public value. Financially, the PR 
sector is stronger than the journalism sector. As a result, PR messages are often transmitted untouched. 
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7. Policies, Laws, and Regulators
7.1 Policies and Laws
7.1.1 Digital Switch-over of Terrestrial Transmission
7.1.1.1 Access and Aff ordability
Th e technical requirement to be met before analog signals could be switched off  was that 100 percent coverage 
of the digital terrestrial signal would be receivable throughout the national territory. Th is provision arises 
from the Electronic Communications Act. No other special requirements for access and aff ordability were 
adopted by the state. Th e Government Commission on Transition to digital terrestrial television introduced 
a logo for set-top boxes fully compatible with the transmission standard in use. It was left up to the suppliers 
whether to obtain this logo from Levira, the broadcasting transmission company (for pay-TV).
7.1.1.2 Subsidies for Equipment
Th e state did not pay any subsidies to audiences for the purchase of digital receiving equipment. Jüri Pihel, 
who heads the Government Commission on the Transition to digital terrestrial television, claimed that such 
subsidies would be “unreasonable.” He substantiated this with reference to EU policies, as Austria had to face 
accusations regarding such subsidies for preferring one particular technology.207
However, earlier in 2010 the Minister of Economic Aff airs and Communications suggested that municipalities 
address the issue of subsidizing the acquisition of set-top boxes for those who could not aff ord it. He wrote 
to the leaders of municipalities, asking them to consider providing aid for disadvantaged citizens within the 
existing system of public allowances, which are mainly allotted by municipalities.208 Th ere are no public 
statistics for how much the municipalities assisted the disadvantaged in their areas, but the initial reactions of 
some municipal leaders interviewed were skeptical.209
207. Quoted in “Pihel: riigi toetus digibokside jagamiseks pole mõistlik” (Pihel: State Subsidies for Distributing Set-top Boxes would be Unreason-
able), BNS/Postimees, 5 March 2010.
208. D. Leitmaa, “Parts palub vaestele digibokse anda” (Parts Asks for Donations of Set-top Boxes for the Poor), Eesti Päevaleht, 6 January 2010.
209. D. Leitmaa, “Parts palub vaestele digibokse anda” (Parts Asks for Donations of Set-top Boxes for the Poor), Eesti Päevaleht, 6 January 2010.
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7.1.1.3 Legal Provisions on Public Interest
Th ere is no explicit invocation of the public interest in the legal framework that governed switch-over. However, 
certain provisions in the Electronic Communications Act make it clear that conceptions of the public interest 
were limited to universal access and the protection of public service broadcasting. As already mentioned, the 
Electronic Communications Act required the digital terrestrial signal to be receivable throughout the national 
territory prior to switch-over. In addition, the provider of multiplexing services is required to ensure the 
transmission of the television programs of public service broadcasters and holders of broadcasting licenses, 
and to provide frequencies for this within the operated multiplexes.
7.1.1.4 Public Consultation
Th e Government Commission on Transition to digital terrestrial television reported on intense cooperation 
with interested parties: equipment suppliers, retail sales agents, broadcasting organizations, and providers of 
transmission and retransmission services.210 Th e fi nal report, however, does not refer to consultations with 
the public or civil society groups.
7.1.2 The Internet
7.1.2.1 Regulation of News on the Internet
News delivery has not been specially regulated on the internet and mobile platforms. All general laws 
regarding media content apply. 
7.1.2.2 Legal Liability for Internet Content
As to independent news production, legal liabilities apply online in the same way as they do in the printed press. 
As the internet also provides readers and site visitors an opportunity to add comments to news stories, liability 
online has presented a controversy as regards who is responsible for UGC. Referring to the Information Society 
Services Act, media organizations have claimed that they do not account for UGC, as “the service provided 
just consists of the mere transmission in a public data communication network of information provided by a 
recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a public data communication network.”211 However, this 
provision includes a condition under which the service provider “does not initiate the transmission.”
As mentioned in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 above, the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Vjatšeslav Leedo 
v. Delfi —thereby setting a precedent—that media organizations are responsible for user comments, as the 
comment sections are part of the content provided by the outlet and serve their business interests. As a result, 
the provision of comment sections cannot be seen as a technical, automatic, and passive service.212 Th us, 
210. Maapealse analoogtelevisiooni levitamise lõpetamine ja täielikule digitaalsele levile üleminek Eestis aastatel 2007–2010 (Closure of Terrestrial Analog 
Television Broadcasting and Overall Transition to Digital Broadcasting in Estonia in 2007–2010), Final Report of the Government Commission 
on Transition to digital terrestrial television, 9 November 2010.
211. Information Society Services Act, Article 8, section 1.
212. Th e Supreme Court Case 3-2-1-43-09 dated 10 June 2009—Vjatšeslav Leedo v. Delfi , at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-43-09 
(in Estonian, accessed 20 January 2011).
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media outlets can no longer claim that they “have not initiated the transmission [i.e. publication].” Th e 
outlets have primarily reacted to this ruling by introducing self-regulatory measures: the “notice-and-take-
down” policy relies on readers to report libelous or defamatory comments. However, this remedy does not 
always work eff ectively or promptly, especially when there is a fl ood of comments.
7.2 Regulators
7.2.1 Changes in Content Regulation
Th e structure of media content regulators has not changed over the past fi ve years. Media issues are under 
the governance of the Ministry of Culture. Th is body acts as a regulator for broadcasters: it issues licenses 
and supervises the implementation of the Media Services Act. It also handles copyright issues and ensures 
compliance with the Act to Regulate Dissemination of Works that Contain Pornography or Promote Violence 
or Cruelty. For the latter task, the ministry has instituted a Media Division to evaluate specifi c cases. Th is 
division employs two offi  cials, but as they also work on other policymaking-related issues, the supervision is 
sporadic and inconsistent. Th e rest of the media landscape, including the internet, is monitored even less by 
the ministry.213 
7.2.2 Regulatory Independence
Th e Ministry of Culture, particularly its Media Division, has been appointed as a regulator within the scope of 
the Media Services Act. Estonia is an exceptional example for not having a technically independent regulatory 
body and thus formally its autonomy can be doubted. On the other hand, as a part of unwritten media policy 
the freedom of the press is perceived as an absolute right, and no offi  cial or politician is inclined to provoke 
resentment from the media community.
Th us, the undermanned unit merely allowed sporadic supervision and cautious enforcement of media-related 
laws, which rendered the legislation ineff ectual.214 In 2012, the Media Division became completely defunct, 
with no active personnel. Th e Minister of Culture, Rein Lang, has claimed the credit for giving up licensing, 
content prescriptions, and the surveillance that these prescriptions entailed.215
However, the ministry itself proposed the establishment of an independent regulator in 2002,216 in order 
to supervise the media services, but nothing changed until early 2013, when amendments to the Media 
Services Act were submitted to Parliament in order to establish the “semi-independent regulator.”217 It is 
213. See Loit and Harro-Loit, “Media policies and regulatory practices.”
214. Loit and Harro-Loit, “Media policies and regulatory practices.”
215. Interviewed in Loit and Harro-Loit, “Media policies and regulatory practices.”
216. Ministry of Culture, “Kultuuriministeeriumi tegevuskava aastateks 2003–2006” (Action Plan of the Ministry of Culture for 2003–2006), Tal-
linn, 2002, pp. 104–105.
217. Th is means that the regulatory body will be embedded in the existing governing system, but policymaking (which remains under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Culture) and law enforcement will be kept apart.
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proposed that the regulator would be part of the TJA, which is accountable to the Ministry of Economic 
Aff airs and Communications and already allocates radio spectrum for broadcasting. According to the draft 
law, the TJA will issue licenses and conduct surveillance, while the Ministry of Culture retains only some 
media policymaking functions in the license issuing procedure: the Minister of Culture shall assign the terms 
of the license and the representative of the Ministry of Culture shall participate in the work of the licensing 
commission. Th e rest is fully accomplished by the TJA. Th e amendment is expected to come into eff ect as of 
1 June 2013.218 
7.2.3 Digital Licensing
Th e Media Services Act institutes an advisory commission to evaluate applications for digital broadcasting 
licenses. According to the Act, the commission shall include up to 11 representatives from agencies related 
to media services and experts. Th e new law entered into force in January 2011. However, the Minister of 
Culture (in offi  ce since April 2011) did not assemble the commission, as the ministry started to draft a bill 
on assigning the law enforcement to an independent agency. Th is resulted in a temporary suspension of 
licensing, although several digital media services under that law (programming in cable networks, catalog-
based services, and other services which do not require radio spectrum) merely need registering without 
licensing and related tenders. Th is registration process has not been suspended. Th e full eff ect of the Media 
Services Act will be seen when the entire licensing procedure transfers to the independent regulator being 
established under a draft law going through Parliament in early 2013 (see section 7.2.2). However, broad 
discontent with the licensing process has not been observed.
7.2.4 Role of Self-regulatory Mechanisms
Media self-regulation consists of the Press Council, founded in 1991. In 2002, it underwent signifi cant decay, 
which led to the creation of a new Press Council affi  liated to the Newspaper Association. As the original Press 
Council also continued to operate, two press councils currently exist.219 
Both print and online journalism have no specifi c laws aff ecting their operations and thus rely mostly on self-
regulation. However, this tends to favor the interests of media organizations rather than those of the public, 
meaning that self-regulatory mechanisms tend to justify media behavior over and above protecting the public 
interest. Th e Estonian media scarcely countenance any criticism. Th erefore, the new council avoids potential 
confl icts arising from criticism of the media, including that emanating from academia. It does not progress 
complaints on the general quality of the media or complaints submitted on behalf of a third party, and 
accepts only complaints about publications not older than three months (the original Press Council accepts 
complaints about publications not older than six months), etc.220
218. 336SE, Bill on Amendments to the Media Services Act and Associated Acts, fi rst reading in Parliament, 23 January 2013.
219. For further details, see H. Harro and E. Lauk. “Self-regulation: Watchdog’s Collar or Shelter for the Guild?,” in Välittämisen tiede. Viestinnän 
näkökulmia yhteiskuntaan, kulttuuriin ja kansalaisuuteen. Professori Ullamaija Kivikurun juhlakirja, Viestinnän julkaisuja 8 (Communications 
Publication 8), Department of Communication, University of Helsinki, 2003, pp. 98–108.
220. Loit and Harro-Loit, “Media policies and regulatory practices.”
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Th e main instrument of media accountability is the code of ethics for the Estonian press, which was adopted 
on the basis of wide consensus from the media associations in 1997. It has never been amended since and 
consequently has no provisions specifi cally addressing online media. Both press councils take complaints 
regarding all media platforms, including online. Th e existing code has been applied to the online media 
pursuant to its applicability. 
Other cases not directly covered by the code are adjudicated on the basis of common sense. However, the 
understanding of “common sense” preferred by both councils may not be identical, as some comparative 
cases (examined by both councils) have shown. In recent years, the new council’s attitude to media practices 
has become signifi cantly more critical. Th ere have been few online-specifi c cases to date, and the rules of 
procedures for press councils are not suited to some distinct aspects of online media. For instance, one 
unique feature is the continuous online availability of articles published some fi ve or even 10 years ago, which 
contain outdated information and may consequently cause undue harm. 
As it took six years after establishing the Press Council to introduce the current code of ethics, it can be 
assumed that it will also take some time to shape self-regulatory provisions for online media.  
7.3 Government Interference
7.3.1 The Market
No cases exist to the best of our knowledge in which the state authorities have interfered with the media with 
a view to distorting the media market.
 
7.3.2 The Regulator
We are not aware of any cases in which the state authorities have interfered with the media through regulatory 
bodies, or in which regulators have abused their powers.
7.3.3 Other Forms of Interference
Th ere have been no cases of extra-legal pressure on digital or non-digital media, to the best of our knowledge. 
Th ere have been no direct pressures or threats against editors and owners regarding content, editorial 
orientation, and personnel.
7.4 Assessments
Th e implementation of digitization has been left largely to the whims of the market, with the government 
maintaining a technology- and service-neutral position, as stipulated by the Electronic Communications Act.
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Th ere has been no change in analog-era practices of public consultation, and a signifi cant defi cit in transparency 
and accountability persists in the digital era. Presumably, this is due to the fact that there are no citizens’ 
associations addressing technological questions in a competent way, except for the interested parties. On the 
other hand, the state procedures lack the cohesion needed to organize and operate a participatory democracy. 
Th is is a larger societal or socio-political problem in Estonia, which predates and extends beyond digitization. 
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8. Conclusions
8.1 Media Today
Media independence has maintained its standing over the past fi ve years. Freedom of speech is highly valued 
and politically protected, with the result that the reach of regulatory institutions in all sectors is limited. In 
the press sector, self-regulation mechanisms have a tendency to protect media organizations from external 
criticism, rather than monitor and eff ectively sanction misconduct. Even in cases where the law refers 
explicitly to media conduct rules, both government agencies and the courts tend to defer to self-regulatory 
mechanisms.
Digitization of the broadcasting sector has somewhat enlarged the number of television channels, leading to 
the emergence of several small and niche channels, distributed mostly in networks with conditional access. 
Th ese niche channels, however, do not have a strict news quota obligation in accordance with the recent 
Media Services Act (which replaces the preceding Broadcasting Act). Even the digitally introduced sister 
channels of the two major television broadcasters either rerun the newscasts of the prime channel or just 
provide text-TV news slides to meet the news quotas imposed by the law. Th us, digitization has not widened 
the choice of current news in television.
Th e fl ourishing of online news spaces has increased the amount of news items and improved the immediacy 
of their publication. On the other hand, resource cuts and responses of media businesses to the demands for 
instant information have meant that news quality has not increased in tandem with news quantity.
While pluralism of voices has not increased in the mainstream media, the explosive expansion of social 
media has enabled various groups of people to share their views and tell their stories. However, people need 
journalistically verifi ed stories that they can trust. Th ere is little evidence to demonstrate that this kind of 
journalism has been bolstered by digitization, and some evidence to suggest that digitization has curtailed it.
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8.2 Media Tomorrow
Over the next fi ve years, it is reasonable to expect improvement in digital services added to media distribution 
streams. Currently, the choice of digital added services is poor relative to the wide range of opportunities 
envisaged at the outset of digitization. Increased convergence across diff erent platforms is also to be expected, 
notably in the fi eld of internet-based technologies for receiving video services using mobile devices.
Th e larger newspaper publishers are introducing new products to be consumed using e-readers and other 
electronic devices. On the other hand, executives from these companies interviewed for this report do not 
expect a very quick transition to online consumption of newspaper content. It has been diffi  cult to charge for 
online articles, without risking signifi cant loss of readership. But it is likely that publishers will have to change 
their practices and start charging once the number of online readers exceeds the number of paper readers. 
Most of the future trends will also depend on the global economic recovery. Th e small size of the Estonian 
media market makes development particularly vulnerable to outside infl uence, all the more so given that the 
decision-makers of the large private media organizations are increasingly located abroad. 
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